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COMMENTS
THE CHILD-PARENT PRIVILEGE: A PROPOSAL
INTRODUCTION

The rule that all relevant evidence is admissible in judicial proceedings'
serves a strong public policy in favor of full development of the facts in
litigation. As such, the rule facilitates the search for truth that lies at the heart
of the adversary system in this country.

2

Therefore, states have broad powers

as to matters that may bear upon the
to compel their citizens to testify
3
outcome of a particular case.
4
The evidentiary privileges protecting communications between two or
they exclude othbecause
rule,
more persons- are exceptions to the general
1. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974); see, e.g., Fed. R. Evid. 402; Cal. Evid.
Code § 350 (West 1966 & Supp. 1979); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-402 (1975); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 20-4-402
(Supp. 1975); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 904.02 (West 1975 & Supp. 1978). The practice of admitting all
relevant evidence is "a presupposition involved in the very conception of a rational system of
evidence." J. Thayer, A Preliminary Treatise On Evidence of the Common Law 264 (1898).
2. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 93-94 (1964) (White, J., concurring); Caesar v.
Mountanos, 542 F.2d 1064, 1069 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 954 (1977).
3. The well-known statement by Dean Wigmore that "the public ... has a right to every man's
evidence," 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 2192, at 70 (rev. ed. J.
McNaughton 1961), has been echoed my many courts. E.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S.
683, 709 (1974); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 688(1972); State v. Halko, 193 A.2d 817, 824
(Del. Super. 1963), aff'd, 204 A.2d 628 (Del. 1964); In re Second Additional Grand Jury v
Cirillo, 16 A.D.2d 605, 607, 230 N.Y.S.2d 303, 306 (1962). There is a corresponding obligation
on the part of citizens to testify about relevant matters. United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331
(1950); Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 281 (1919); McMann v. SEC. 87 F.2d 377, 378 (2d
Cir. 1937).
4. The various privileges for confidential communications form a subcategory under the
general heading of testimonial privileges. 8 J. Wigmore, supra note 3, § 2197, at 113-14. The second
type of testimonial privilege excludes testimony relating to a particular topic. Id Examples of
privileged topics include governmental or state secrets, e.g., United States v. Reymolds, 345 U.S. 1,
6-7 (1953); official information, e.g., Cal. Evid. Code § 1040 (West 1966 & Supp. 1979);
identity of governmental informers, e.g., id. § 1041 (Vest 1966 & Supp. 1979); Wis. Stat.
Ann. § 905.10 (West 1975 & Supp. 1978); political vote, e.g., N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A-84A-25
(West 1976 & Supp. 1978); trade secrets, e.g., Cal. Evid. Code § 1060 (West 1966 & Supp. 1979);
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:84A-26 (West 1976); Wis. Stat Ann. § 905.08 (West 1975 & Supp. 1978). See
generally 8 J. Wigmore, supra note 3, §§ 2210-2224.
5. In general, the confidential communications privileges are designed to protect private
communications between two people, e.g., husband and wife, priest and penitent. Thus, communication through or in the presence of a third person will ordinarily negative any presumption of
confidentiality. See, e.g., Wolfle v. United States, 291 U.S. 7 (1934) (statements in letter dictated by
defendant to his wife and transcribed by stenographer held not to fall within the husband-wife
confidential communications privilege); People v. Castiel, 153 Cal. App. 2d 653, 315 P.2d 79 (1957)
(the attorney-client privilege does not prevent a third person who was openly present and overheard
a conversation between attorney and client from testifying as to the contents of the conversation).
There are several qualifications to this rule. For example, the presence of a representative or
employee of an attorney during a professional consultation will normally not destroy the
confidentiality of the communication. See, e.g., Cal. Evid. Code § 952 (West 1966 & Supp. 1978);
N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law § 4503(a) (McKinney Supp. 1978). Similarly, a psychologist- or
psychotherapist-patient privilege may attach even though there were third persons present during
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erwise relevant evidence. 6 Their creation represents a judicial7 or legislative
determination that preserving and fostering certain relationships outweighs
the potential benefit to the judicial system of compelled disclosure. 8 Typically,
the privileged relationship is a socially desirable one 9 which requires confidentiality to function optimally. 10 By protecting communications made in
confidence, a privilege both preserves the privacy of the instant relationship I I
between others involved in the same
and encourages open communication
12
type of beneficial association.
Because privileges protect confidentiality at the possible expense of accurate
adjudication,' 3 they have never received universal acceptance from courts or
commentators. 14 Indeed, some commentators advocate the abolition of formal
the communication if the claimant can show that the third person was in some way necessary to
effectuate the purpose of the consultation. See, e.g., Yaron v. Yaron, 83 Misc.2d 276, 372
N.Y.S.2d 518 (Sup. Ct. 1975) (New York's statutory privilege for communications between
psychologist and client interpreted to encompass consultations and interviews between family
counseling agency and spouses who were attempting to preserve their marriage); Cal. Evid. Code
§ 1012 (West Supp. 1978).
6. C. McCormick, Handbook of the Law of Evidence § 72, at 151-52 (2d ed. 1972); 8 J.
Wigmore, supra note 3, § 2192(3), at 73.
7. Although a privilege may be created through judicial action, it is far more common for it to
arise out of legislative enactment. C. McCormick, supra note 6, § 77, at 156; Slovenko, Psychiatry
and a Second Look at the Medical Privilege, 6 Wayne L. Rev. 175, 181 (1960).
8. C. McCormick, supra note 6, § 72, at 152; Louisell, Confidentiality, Conformity and
Confusion: Privileges in FederalCourt Today, 31 Tul. L. Rev. 101, 110 (1956) [hereinafter cited as
Privileges Today]; Reutlinger, Policy, Privacy, and Prerogatives:A Critical Examination of the
Proposed FederalRules of Evidence as They Affect Marital Privilege, 61 Cal. L. Rev. 1353, 1360
(1973).
9. 8 J. Wigmore, supra note 3, § 2285, at 527.
10. Id. Dean Wigmore lists "four fundamental conditions" which must be satisfied before a
privilege should be recognized: "(1) The communications must originate in a cotidence that they
will not be disclosed. [See note 341 infra and accompanying text.] (2) This element of cot/identiality
must be essential to the full and satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the parties. [See
notes 90-91, 126-30 infra and accompanying text.] (3) The relation must be one which In the
opinion of the community ought to be sedulously fostered. [See notes 89, 112-14 ijftra and
accompanying text.] (4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the
communications must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal of
litigation." [See notes 161-74 infra and accompanying text.] Id.
11. Mullen v. United States, 263 F.2d 275, 280 (D.C Cir. 1958) (Fahy, J., concurring) ("The
benefit of preserving [the husband-wife, attorney-client, and priest-penitent] confidences inviolate
overbalances the possible benefit of permitting litigation to prosper at the expense of the tranquility
of the home, the integrity of the professional relationship, and the spiritual rehabilitation of a
penitent."); Privileges Today, supra note 8, at 110-11.
12. People v. Shapiro, 308 N.Y. 453, 458-59, 126 N.E.2d 559, 561-62 (1955); 8 J. Wigmore,
supra note 3, § 2291, at 545 (attorney-client privilege); Note, The Marital Testimony And Communications Privileges: Improvements And Uncertainties in California and Federal Courts, 9 U.
Cal. D. L. Rev. 569, 594 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Marital Testimony] (husband-wife confidential
communications privilege). See generally Reutlinger, supra note 8, at 1358.
13. See note 6 supra and accompanying text.
14. See, e.g., McCormick, Law and the Future: Evidence, 51 Nw. L. Rev. 218, 220-21 (1956)
(criticizing privileges in general); Morgan, Some Observations Concerning a Model Code of Evidence, 89 U. Pa. L. Rev. 145, 152-53 (1940) (criticizing the attorney-client and husband-wife
privileges); Comment, Questioning the Marital Privilege: A Medieval Philosophy in a Modern
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privileges altogether, suggesting instead that the exclusion of testimony be a
matter of judicial discretion. 5 Nevertheless, not only have the traditional
privileges-attorney-client, husband-wife, priest-penitent, physician-patientlargely endured,16 but the last twenty years have witnessed an influx of new
privileges protecting communications between laypersons and professionals in
17
a wide variety of fields.
Unlike the expansion of professional privileges,18 there has been no similar
legislative movement in the area of nonprofessional relationships. In fact, the
only communications privilege that does not have a professional as one of its
beneficiaries is the privilege protecting marital communications. 1 9 Private
communications 20between other family members, for example, have never
been privileged.

Particularly striking is the absence of a privilege for confidential communications between child and parent. From a historical perspective, the lack of a
World, 7 Cum. L. Rev. 307, 318-22 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Marital Privilege] (criticizing
marital confidential communications privilege). Probably the most widely criticized privilege is that
protecting communications between physician and patient. E.g., 8 J. Wigmore, supra note 3, §
2380a; Curd, PrivilegedCommunicationsBetween the Doctorand his Patient-AnAnomaly of the
Law, 44 W. Va. L.Q. 165 (1938). Even the most accepted of all privileges, the attorney-client
privilege, has its detracters. E.g., Morgan, supra, at 152-53.
15. C. McCormick, supra note 6, § 77 at 159; Note, Privileged Communications: .4 Case by
Case Approach, 23 Me. L. Rev. 443, 445 (1971) (suggesting such an approach for professional
privileges).
16. C. McCormick, supra note 6, § 77, at 157. It should be noted, however, that the proposed
Federal Rules of Evidence did not include either a physician-patient or marital communications
privilege. See Proposed Fed. R_ Evid. 504, Advisory Comm. Note, 56 F.R.D. 240 (1972);
Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 505, Advisory Comm. Note, 56 F.R.D. 245, 245-46 (1972). Rules 504 and
505, however, were edited out of the final draft. H.R. Rep. No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 8-9
(1973), reprinted in [1974] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 7075, 7082.
17. See notes 67-73 infra and accompanying text.
18. This trend has been viewed with alarm by some commentators who suggest that the
creation of some of the newer privileges has arisen not out of any proven need for secrecy within a
given relationship, but rather "to serve the purposes of politically powerful groups seeking the
convenience and prestige of a professionally-based privilege." C. McCormick, supra note 6, § 77, at
159 (footnote omitted); accord, 8 J. Wigmore, supra note 3, § 2286, at 532; cf. Rosenheim,
Privilege, Confidentiality,and Juvenile Offenders, 11 Wayne L. Rev. 660, 664-65 (1965) (noting the
relative absence of such "campaigns" on the part of social workers).
19. See Fisher, The PsychotherapeuticProfessions and the Law of PrivilegedCommunications,
10 Wayne L. Rev. 609, 611 (1964). The privilege for confidential communications between husband
and wife exists in over forty American jurisdictions and several foreign jurisdictions. For a
compilation of statutes, see 2 J. Wigmore, supra note 3, § 488.
20. C. McCormick, supra note 6, § 79, at 165. But see Coburn, Child-ParentCommunications:
Spare the Privilege and Spoil the Child, 74 Dick. L. Rev. 599, 600 n.5 (1970) (in some parts of
Europe, relatives by blood or marriage are incompetent to testify as witnesses and can claim a
privilege against self-incrimination if asked to testify against members of their families). Marital
communications made in the presence of other family members old enough to comprehend the
communications are usually not privileged. E.g., In re A & M, 61 A.D.2d 426, 428-29, 403
N.Y.S.2d 375, 377 (1978); In re Bourne's Estate, 206 Misc. 378, 133 N.Y.S.2d 192 (Surr, Ct.
1954); Fuller v. Fuller, 100 W. Va. 309, 130 S.E. 270 (1925); Chamberlain v. State, 348 P.2d 280
(Wyo. 1960). But see Hicks v. Hicks, 271 N.C. 204, 155 S.E.2d 799 (1967) (presence of eight year
old daughter did not destroy confidentiality).
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privilege seems odd in light of the consistent recognition of the family as an
autonomous social unit and the emphasis placed on preserving its sanctity and
harmony. 2I Today, although the concept of the nuclear family as a haven of
peace and harmony has been seriously questioned, 22 there is a continued
recognition of the importance of familial openness and interaction to the
child's psychological and social development. 23 Nevertheless, no state has
enacted a statutory privilege for communications between child and parent. 24
Moreover, attempts in recent years by litigant, to persuade courts to recognize
a child-parent privilege have been largely unsuccessful. 2 5 Typically, these
decisions cite the lack of a statute protecting such communications,
rather
26
than any strong aversion to the concept of such a privilege.
In light of this legislative inaction and judicial reluctance, the opinion last
year by the New York Appellate Division in In re A & M 27 is something of an
anomaly. In that case, the court stated that if all members of the family seek
to prevent disclosure, 28 communications made by a child to his parents
regarding his participation in a crime may be constitutionally protected by "a
right of family privacy. '29 The court did not hold any specific communication
to be privileged; 3 0 indeed, it avoided placing the label "privilege" on the
testimonial exemption it had created. 31 Nevertheless, the case has farreaching implications both for the law of evidence and for constitutional law.
As to the former, the court constructed the outlines of a confidential communications privilege previously unrecognized by any American court or
21. "Our decisions establish that the Constitution pro.ects the sanctity of the family precisely
because the institution of the family is deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition." Moore
v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (footnote omitted).
22. See A. Skolnick, The Intimate Environment 53, 125-35 (1973); Birdwhistell, The Idealized
Model of the American Family, in The Family 310 (P. Stein, J. Richman & N. Hannon eds.
1977).
23. See notes 112-16 infra and accompanying text.
24. See Cissnav. State, -Inc. App. -,-,
352 N.E.2d 793, 795 (1976). Atleast one commentator
has proposed a child-parent confidential communications privilege. Coburn, supra note 20, at 613- 33.
25. See In re Kinoy, 326 F. Supp. 400, 406 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); In re Terry W., 59 Cal. App. 3d
745, 749, 130 Cal. Rptr. 913, 915 (1976); Hunter v. State, --. Ind. App. -, -, 360 N.E.2d 588, 598,
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 906 (1977). Cissna v. State, - Ind. App. -, -, 352 N.E.2d 793, 795 (1976).
A possible precursor to these relatively recent cases is Lindsey v. People, 66 Colo. 343, 181 P. 531
(1919), appeal dismissed, 255 U.S. 560 (1921), in which a juvenile court judge sought to invoke a
privilege for private, informal conversations he had had with a minor who was suspected of
murdering his father. The judge argued that he had assumed a position in loco parentlis to the boy
immediately after the crime was committed. In rejecting his claim, the court noted that the
privilege "is one which is denied a natural parent." Id. at 355, 181 P. at 536.
26. In re Kinoy, 326 F. Supp. 400, 406 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); In re Terry W., 59 Cal. App. 3d 745,
748-49, 130 Cal. Rptr. 913, 914-15 (1976); Cissna v. State, -- Ind. App. -, -, 352 N.E.2d 793, 795
(1976). But see Hunter v. State, - Ind. App. -, -, 360 N.E.2d 588, 598, cert. denied, 434 U.S.
906 (1977) (rejecting the theory of a child-parent privilege).
27. 61 A.D.2d 426, 403 N.Y.S.2d 375 (1978).
28. Id. at 435 n.9, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 381 n.9. The requirement that all family members must
desire to preserve confidentiality eliminates many situations from the parameters of the "privilege."
For example, the cases cited in note 25 supra involved claims of privilege asserted by only one
family member. See notes 275-77 infra and accompanying text.
29. 61 A.D.2d at 429, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 378.
30. Id. at 435, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 381.
31. Id. at 434-35, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 381.
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legislature. 32 As to the latter, the court expanded the amorphous constitutional right of privacy 33 to include the right to preserve the confidentiality of
certain family conversations 34even against the strong state interest in facilitating the factfinding process.

As a result of the decision in In re A & M, it is likely that claims of

35
privilege among family members will be asserted with increasing frequency.
This Comment will analyze the arguments for and against creating a privilege
for communications made in confidence by a child to his parent. Because the
rationale for the proposed privilege derives in part from the rationales for
several of the more familiar privileges, Part I will present a brief examination
of the marital privileges and the various privileges protecting communications
between patients and psychotherapists. Part II will contend that, as a matter
of policy, a child-parent privilege should be recognized. Part I will examine
the possibility of constitutional protection for child-parent communications
notwithstanding the absence of a statute. Finally, a proposed statute for a
joint privilege will be set out in the Appendix.

I.

THE MARITAL AND PSYCHOTHERAPEUTIC PRIVILEGES

A. The Marital Privileges
Two privileges are generally recognized between husband and wife in the
United States today:36 the privilege to exclude adverse testimony or "antimarital fact" privilege 37 and the privilege for confidential communications.

38

32. See notes 24-25 supra and accompanying text.
33. For discussions of the open-ended nature of the right of privacy, see Henkin, Privacy and
Autonomy, 74 Colum. L. Rev. 1410 (1974); McKay, The Right of Privacy: Emanations and
Intimations, 64 Mich. L. Rev. 259 (1965).
34. 61 A.D.2d at 433, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 380-81.
35. Indeed, this trend may have already begun. Eight months after the decision in In re.4 & .11,
the Appellate Division was presented with another claim of child-parent privilege in In re Mark G.,
- A.D.2d -,
410 N.Y.S.2d 464 (1978). In that case, however, the child alone asserted the privilege.
The claim was denied because the court found no evidence "that respondent made the statement to
his father in confidence and for the purpose of obtaining support, advice or guidance, nor that the
father wished to remain silent and keep respondent's answer confidential." Id. at ,410 N.Y.S.2d
at 465.
36. At common law there was a third rule, incompetency, which did not operate as a privilege,
but rather was a total disqualification of a party's spouse from testifying for or against the other. 2
J. Wigrore, supra note 3, at §§ 600-620. Today, marital incompetency has generally been
abolished or severely restricted in most states. Id. § 602, at 737. Spousal incompetency has also
been abolished in federal courts. Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371 (1933).
37. 8 J. Wigmore, supra note 3, §§ 2227-2228. Wigmore coined the phrase -anti-marital fact"
which emphasizes that the privilege excludes only testimony by one spouse which would be
adverse to the other. Id. § 2234, at 231. Some commentators distinguish between the classic
formulation of the privilege which permits one spouse to prevent the other from testifying against
him and the less common "privilege of one spouse to refrain from testifying against the other.
Note, The Husband-Wife Evidentiary Privileges: Is Marriage Really Necessary, 1977 Ariz. St.
L.J. 411, 413 [hereinafter cited as Evidentiary Privileges]. Because both exclude adverse
testimony and have the same underlying rationale, however, they are referred to as one general
privilege. See, e.g., 8 J. igmore, supra note 3, § 2241; Note, The Husband-Wlife Privileges of
Testimonial Non-Disclosure, 56 Nw. U.L. Rev. 208, 209-16 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Testimonial Non-Disclosure].
38. 8 J. Wigmore, supra note 3, §§ 2332-2341; McCormick, supra note 6, §§ 78-86
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Although the two overlap, 39 different justifications have traditionally been
who recognize the validity of
advanced for each 40 and some commentators
4
one privilege completely reject the other. '
The privilege to exclude adverse testimony prevents the spouse of a party
from testifying if the testimony would be harmful to the interests of the
party. 42 Two reasons are generally given in support of the privilege against
adverse testimony. One is that the privilege prevents dissension within the
family which might result from compelling one spouse to testify against the
other. 43 The second is a "natural repugnance" experienced by society at the
idea of condemning one spouse with the testimony of the other. 4 4 Both
justifications have been criticized by commentators. The repugnancy rationale
has been dismissed as an outworn sentiment which is easily outweighed by the
competing interests of the state and litigants. 45 As for preventing dissension,
the primary objection seems to be that there is no cause and effect relationship
between the privilege and family harmony; a good relationship is not dependent upon testamentary immunity and a troubled one will not be saved by
it.

46

39. 8 J.Wigmore, supra note 3, § 2333, at 644; Testimonial Non-Disclosure, supra note 37, at
218.
40. Compare notes 43-44 infra and accompanying text with note 51 infra and accompanying text.
41. Wigmore approves of the confidential communications privilege, 8 J.Wigmore, supra note 3,
§ 2332, at 643, but believes the privilege against adverse testimony to be "illogical and unfounded."
Id. § 2228, at 218. Conversely, the drafters of the proposed Federal Rules of Evidence omitted a
privilege for confidential communications, but included a privilege for an accused to exclude adverse
spousal testimony, Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 505, 56 F.R.D. 244 (1972), stating that it "represent[s] the
one aspect of marital privilege the continuation of which is warranted." Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 505,
Advisory Comm. Note, 56 F.R.D. 245, 245 (1972). McCormick is critical of both privileges. C.
McCormick, supra note 6, § 66, at 145 (adverse testimony privilege); id. § 86, at 173 (confidential
communications privilege).
42. 8 J. Wigmore, supra note 3, § 2234. Part of the confusion surrounding the privilege, see note
37 supra, stems from the variations in defining to whom the privilege belongs. See generally 8 J.
Wigmore, supra note 3, § 2241. In a majority of jurisdictions, the party is the holder of the privilege
and may invoke it to prevent his spouse from testifying against him. E.g., Hawkins v. United States,
358 U.S. 74 (1958) (defendant husband permitted to exclude his wife's testimony notwithstanding her
willingness to take the stand); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-4062 (1978); Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann.
art. 38.11 (Vernon Supp. 1966-1978); see C. McCormick, supra note 6, § 66, at 144-45. Sometimes,
however, the privilege belongs to both spouses, either of whom may claim it. E.g., N.J. Stat. Ann. §
2A:84A-17(2) (West 1976);see C. McCormick, supra note 6, § 66, at 145. A minority of states have
enacted statutes affording the privilege to the witness spouse only. E.g., Cal. Evid. Code § 970 (West
1966 & Supp. 1979); Il. Ann. Stat. ch. 38, § 155-1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1978); accord, Proposed Fed.
R. Evid. 505, Advisory Comm. Note, 56 F.R.D. 245, 245 (1972).
Regardless of who the holder is, numerous exceptions to the privilege have been articulated. For
example, there is no privilege under most statutes where a crime has been committed by one spouse
against the other, against the children of either or in actions brought by one spouse against the other,
such as divorce, commitment, abandonment orsupport proceedings. See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 13-4062(1) (West 1978); Cal. Evid. Code § 972 (West Supp. 1978); 8 J.Wigmore, supra note 3, §§
2239-2240.
43. Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74, 77 (1958); 8J. Wigmore, supra note 3, § 2228, at 216.
44. 8 J.Wigmore, supra note 3, § 2228, at 217-18 (emphasis omitted).
45. Id. at 218; Evidentiary Privileges, supra note 37, at 427.
46. C. McCormick, supra note 6, § 66, at 145-46; 8J. Wigmore, supra note 3, § 2228, at 216;
Evidentiary Privileges, supra note 37, at 427.
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The privilege for confidential communications prohibits testimony by a

spouse concerning communications made in confidence by one spouse to the
other during the marriage. 47 The major distinction between it and the

privilege to exclude adverse testimony is that the latter excludes adverse
testimony by a spouse whether or not that testimony relates to confidential

communications between the spouses.4 8 The privilege for confidential communications, however, prevents disclosure of spousal conversations or, in

some states, "communicative acts", 49 whether or not the subject matter of the
communication is actually adverse to the interests of the spouse claiming the
privilege. 50
The justification usually advanced for the confidential communications
privilege is that it encourages open communication between spouses, thereby
fostering a socially beneficial relationship. s l Although the rationales for the
privilege against adverse testimony focus upon a preservation of the presumed
happiness and harmony already existing within the marital relationship, the
47. C. McCormick, supra note 6, § 78. Unlike the privilege against adverse testimony, the
confidential communications privilege can be claimed whether or not a spouse is a party to the
proceeding. E.g., Cal. Evid. Code § 980 (West 1966 & Supp. 1979); N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law § 4502(b)
(McKinney 1963);Reutlinger,supra note 8, at 1364. For a compilation of statutes, see 2 J. Wigmore,
supra note 3, § 488.
48. 8 J. Wigmore, supra note 3, § 2333, at 644.
49. See, e.g., People v. Burton, 6 Ill. App. 3d 879, 887,286 N.E.2d 792, 798 (1972), cert. denied,
411 U.S. 937 (1973); Shepherd v. State, 257 Ind. 229, 230, 277 N.E.2d 165, 166 (1971); People v.
Daghita, 299 N.Y. 194, 198-99, 86 N.E.2d 172, 174, 90 N.Y.S.2d 196, 198-99 (1949). Contra,
State v. Drury, 110 Ariz. 447, 454, 520 P.2d 495, 502 (1974); People v. Bradford, 70 Cal.2d 333,
342, 450 P.2d 46, 50, 74 Cal. Rptr. 726, 730 (1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 911 (1970). See
generally C. McCormick, supra note 6, § 79; 8 J. Wigmore, supra note 3, § 2337.
50. 8 J. Wigmore, supra note 3, § 2333, at 644. In practice, however, the types of communications that will be sought to be withheld are those that tend to incriminate one of the spouses. Id. In
order to be privileged, the communication must have been "confidential," i.e., it must have arisen
out of and in reliance upon the marital relationship. Id. § 2336, at 648. If a statute does not
expressly require confidentiality, most courts will imply it. Id. Compare Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 12-2232 (1956) (no requirements of confidentiality); Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.11
(Vernon 1966 & Supp. 1966-1978) (same) with Cal. Evid. Code § 980 (West 1966 & Supp. 1979)
(express requirements of confidentiality); N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law § 4502(b) (McKinney 1963) (same).
In the absence of facts to the contrary, confidentiality is often presumed. Blau v. United States,
340 U.S. 332, 334 (1951); Wolfle v. United States, 291 U.S. 7, 14 (1934). See also Cal. Evid. Code
§ 917 (West 1966 & Supp. 1978). This presumption disappears, however, if the communication
related to everyday business matters, e.g., Parkhurst v. Berdell, 110 N.Y. 386, 393-94, 18 N.E.
123, 127 (1888), or was made in the presence of third persons, e.g., Pereira v. United States, 347
U.S. 1, 6 (1954); Wolfle v. United States, 291 U.S. 7, 14 (1934); People v. Melski, 10 N.Y.2d 78,
81-82, 176 N.E.2d 81, 84, 217 N.Y.S.2d 65, 68 (1961), even if those persons are the couple's
children. See note 20 supra.
Although some statutes afford the privilege to both spouses, e.g., Cal. Evid. Code § 980 (West 1966
& Supp. 1978), and afew to the spouse to whom the communication is made, e.g., N.M. Stat. Ann. §
20-1-12(a) (1953 & Supp. 1975), the better rule seems to be to make the communicating spouse the
holder. C. McCormick, supra note 6, § 83, at 169; 8 J. Wigmore, supra note 3, § 2340, at 670;
see, e.g., N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law § 4502(b) (McKinney 1963). Making the communicating party the
holder seems best designed to further the underlying policy of the privilege, which is to foster
open communication between the spouses. See note 51 infra and accompanying text.
51. 8 J. Wigmore, supra note 3, § 2332; Reutlinger, supra note 8, at 1358-59.
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In the im-

mediate case it protects the expectations of privacy of the communicating
spouse, 5 2 but its larger 5goal
is to foster communication generally within the
3
institution of marriage.

Although the privilege for confidential communications is probably more
favorably regarded than the privilege against adverse testimony, 54 it too has
its critics. The main argument against the privilege is that it does not serve its
intended purpose, primarily because free communication occurs as a result of
pre-existing trust in the marital partner and not because of the existence of a
privilege.5 5 Furthermore, assuming that the existence of the privilege might
encourage spouses to confide in each other, very few couples are aware of its
existence5 6 and its salutary effects are therefore negligible. A third criticism of
the privilege is that the marital relationship, unlike the professional relationships, is not exclusively based upon verbal communication; therefore, the
need for a privilege between
married couples is not as great as the need for the
57
professional privileges.
The principal effect of these derogations of the privilege has been legislative
and judicial restriction, rather than complete abrogation. 58 Similarly, exceptions to the privilege against adverse testimony are being carved out with
increasing frequency, particularly at the federal level. 5 9 Nevertheless, the
marital privileges, in one form or another, remain an integral part of most
state evidentiary codes. 60 Their continued vitality indicates a legislative and
52.

See Privileges Today, supra note 8, at 113.

53. See note 51 supra and accompanying text.
54. Reutlinger, supra note 8, at 1381-82; Testimonial Non-Disclosure, supra note 37, at 216.
55. C. McCormick, supra note 6, § 86, at 172-73; Marital Privilege, supra note 14, at 320.
56. "[V]ery few people ever get into court, and practically no one outside the legal profession
knows anything about the rules regarding privileged communications between spouses." Hutchins &
Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law ofEvidence: Family Relations, 13 Minn. L. Rev. 675, 682
(1929) (footnote omitted). It has been suggested that the privileges within professional relationships
are more well-known than the marital privilege because they "have as one party a professional person
who can be expected to inform the other of the existence of the privilege." Proposed Fed. R. Evid.
505, Advisory Comm. Note, 56 F.R.D. 245, 246 (1972).
57. Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 505, Advisory Comm. Note, 56 F.R.D. 245, 246 (1972). But see
Privileges Today, supra note 8, at 113 (freedom of communication within the marital relation is a
"psychological necessity").
58. One relatively recent exception denies a privilege in criminal proceedings where the defendant seeks to introduce into evidence a communication made to him by his spouse which is material to
his defense. E.g., Cal. Evid. Code § 987 (West 1966 & Supp. 1979); Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art.
38.11 (Vernon 1966 & Supp. 1966-1978). See generally 8J. Wigmore, supra note 3, § 2338(4). Another
recently developed exception precludes application of the privilege when a communication was made
to enable or aid anyone to commit a crime or fraud. E.g. Cal. Evid. Code § 981 (West 1966 &
Supp. 1979).
59. See, e.g., United States v. Trammel, 583 F.2d 1166, 1169 (10th Cir. 1978) (defendant cannot
invoke the privilege to prevent his spouse from testifying if she has been granted immunity in
exchange for testimony relating to a crime in which both she and defendant participated), cert.
granted, 99 S. Ct. 1277 (1979); United States v. Allery, 526 F.2d 1362, 1367 (8th Cir. 1975)
(spousal testimony held admissible in federal child abuse prosecutions); United States v. Apodaca,
522 F.2d 568, 571 (10th Cir. 1975) (no privilege when witness had married spouse three days
before trial).
60. 2 J. Wigmore, supra note 3, § 488 (citing statutes).
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judicial determination that invading the privacy of the marital relationship is
simply too high a price to pay for the possible benefits of compelled disclosure. 61

B. The PsychotherapeuticPrivileges
During the last twenty years, there has been a rapid development of various
privileges protecting communications between a patient and a psychotherapist. 6 2 In fact, next to the privilege for attorney-client communications,
the psychotherapeutic privilege is probably the most widely accepted privilege
today. The primary rationale for the privilege is that confidentiality is a
necessary prerequisite to the maintenance of such a relationship. 63 Because
successful therapy requires the utmost trust between patient and
psychotherapist, 64 a privilege is essential to assure the patient that the
intimate and embarrassing statements made in the course of treatment will
not be divulged. 65 Moreover, compelling a psychotherapist to disclose such
communications would be likely to have an inhibiting effect upon others
66
engaged in therapy and might deter some from seeking help altogether.
Many states have no general psychotherapist-patient privilege, but have
specific privileges solely for psychologists. 67 A few states have separate
privileges for psychiatrists. 68 Other groups that have either been included
under a general psychotherapist-patient privilege or have won privileges of
their own include social workers, 69 marriage and family counselors, 70 school
psychologists, 7 1 teachers, 72 and guidance counselors.

73

The same rationale

61. Reutlinger, supra note 8, at 1360.
62. See notes 67-73 infra and accompanying text.
63. Note, Limitations on California Professional Privileges: Waiver Principles And The
Policies They Promote, 9 U. Cal. L. Rev. 477, 488 (1976).
64. Louisell, The Psychologist in Today's Legal World (pt. 2), 41 Minn. L. Rev. 731, 745-46
[hereinafter cited as Psychologist]; Rosenheim, supra note 18, at 670.
65. "The psychiatric patient confides more utterly than anyone else in the world. He exposes to
the therapist not only what his words directly express; he lays bare his entire self, his dreams, his
fantasies, his sins, and his shame." Taylor v. United States, 222 F.2d 398, 401 (D.C. Cir. 1955)
(quoting M. Guttmacher & H. Weihofen, Psychiatry and the Law 272 (1952)); see C. McCormick,
supra note 6, § 99, at 213 n.9; Slovenko, supra note 7, at 184-85.
66. 'fT]he disclosure of confidences may not only destroy the single psychotherapeutic relationship, but the fact of disclosure may become common knowledge and thus upset the sensitive
relationships which have been established with a great number of clients ... " Fisher, supra note 19,
at 629 (discussing psychotherapy in schools and institutional settings). See also Comment, Underprivileged Communications: Extension of the Psychotherapist-PatientPrivilegeto Patientsof Psychiatric Social Workers, 61 U. Cal. L. Rev. 1050, 1053-54 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Underprivileged Communications].
67. E.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-90-107(g) (1973 & Supp. 1976); N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law § 4S08
(McKinney Supp. 1964-1978); see 8 J. Wigmore, supra note 3, § 2286, at 524 n.23 (citing statutes).
68. E.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 52-146d (West 1979); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 51, § 52 (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1978); see 8 J. Wigmore, supra note 3, § 2286, at 534 n.22(b) (citing statutes).
69. E.g., Cal. Evid. Code §§ 1010(c), 1014 (West 1966 & Supp. 1978) (included within general
psychotherapist-patient privilege); N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law § 4508 (McKinney Supp. 1964-1978) (separate privilege).
70. E.g., Cal. Evid. Code §§ 1010(e), 1014 (West Supp. 1978) (included within general
psychotherapist-patient privilege).
71. E.g., id. §§ 1010(d), 1014 (included within general psychotherapist-patient privilege);
Idaho Code § 9-203.6 (Supp. 1978) (separate privilege).
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applies to all: a guarantee of confidentiality is necessary in order
for the
74
professional to provide satisfactory and socially beneficial care.
C.

The Marital, Psychotherapeutic,and Child-ParentRelationships:
Common Elements

Traditionally, the rationales for the privileges between husband and wife
have been viewed as fundamentally different from those supporting the
psychotherapist-patient privilege. 75 Certain similarities in their underlying

bases do exist, however. First, both relationships are considered to be socially

desirable. 76 Second, communication about highly personal matters occurs
frequently in each. 77 Third, there is an expectation inherent in both relationships that whatever is revealed in confidence will remain private. 78 Finally,
confidentiality is essential if either beneficial relationship is to function optimally.

79

Obviously, the dynamics of the two relationships are very different. The

psychotherapist-patient relationship is almost exclusively verbal; 80 the marital
relationship is presumably held together by love, affection, and some degree
of emotional commitment, as well as the exchange of verbal confidences. 8 1
Communication between spouses ideally consists of a mutual sharing of
intimacies and a mutual support,8 2 whereas in the psychotherapist-patient
72. E.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 10-154a (West Supp. 1979) (privilege granted when communications relate to alcohol or drug problems); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 600.2165 (West Supp.
1979) (separate privilege).
73. E.g., Ind. Code Ann. § 20-6.1-6-15 (Bums Supp. 1978) (separate privilege); Me. Rev.
Stat. Ann. tit. 20, § 806 (West Supp. 1965-1978) (same).
74. See Fisher, supra note 19, at 618; LoGatto, Privileged Communication and the Social
Worker, 8 Cath. Law. 5, 5 (1962); Robinson, Testimonial Privilege and the School Guidance
Counselor, 25 Syracuse L. Rev. 911, 925-26 (1974); UnderprivilegedCommunications,supra note 66,
at 1057-58; Note, A Suggested Privilegefor ConfidentialCommunications with MarriageCounsellors, 106 U. Pa. L. Rev. 266, 271-73 (1957).
75. Compare notes 43-44, 51 supra and accompanying text with notes 63-65 supra and
accompanying text.
76. Inre Lifschutz, 2 Cal.3d 415, 421-22, 467 P.2d 557,560-51, 85 Cal. Rptr. 829, 832-33 (1970)
(psychotherapist-patient relation); see Privileges Today, supra note 8, at 113 (marital relation);
Reutlinger, supra note 8, at 1360 (same); Testimonial Non-Disclosure,supra note 37, at 218 (same).
77. A. Skolnick, The Intimate Environment 223-29 (1973) (marital relation); M. Guttmacher &
H. Weihofen, Psychiatry and the Law 272 (1952) (psychotherapist-patient relation); Berger &
Kellner, Marriageand the ConstructionofReality: An Exe.rcise in the Microsociology ofKnowledge,
in The Family 178, 184 (P. Stein, J. Richman & N. Hannon eds. 1977) (marital relation); Psychologist, supra note 64, at 745 (psychotherapist-patient relation).
78. M. Guttmacher & H. Weihofen, supra note 77, at 272 (psychotherapist-patient relation);
Bloustein, Group Privacy: The Right to Huddle, 8 Rut.-Cam. L.J. 219, 222-23 (1977) (lovers);
Russell, On Marriage,in Family in Transition 283, 286 (A. Skolnick & J. Skolnick eds. 1971) (marital
relation); Slovenko, supra note 7, at 185 (psychotherapist-patient relation).
79. C. McCormick, supra note 6, § 99, at 213 n.9 (psychotherapist-patient relation); 8 J.
Wigmore,supra note 3, § 2332, at 642 (marital relation);PrivilegesToday, supra note 8, at 113 (same);
Psychologist, supra note 64, at 744-45 (psychotherapist-patient relation).
80. See Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 505, Advisory Comm. Note, 56 F.R.D. 24S, 246 (1972).
81. Berger & Kellner, Marriageandthe Construction ofReality: An Exercise in the Microsociology of Knowledge, in The Family 178, 180 (P. Stein, J. Richman & N. Hannon eds. 1977). See also
Evidentiary Privileges, supra note 37, at 428.
82. Russell, supra note 78, at 286.
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relationship the patient reveals and the therapist guides and supports.8 3
Finally, although the assurance of confidentiality is a prerequisite to a
satisfactory relationship in both instances, 84 it is clear that the psychotherapist
would be totally unable to function unless he could promise his patient some
measure of secrecy;8 5 the marital relationship conceivably could, and un86
doubtedly does, exist without the expectation of complete confidentiality.
Upon examination of the relationship between child and parent, certain
similarities to both of the above relationships emerge. Ideally, the child-parent
relationship encompasses aspects of the marital relationship--mutual love,
affection, and intimacy.8 7-as well as elements of the relationship between
psychotherapist and patient-the parent providing emotional guidance and
the child relying on him for help and support.8 8 Because parental influence is
probably the most important factor in a child's emotional development, 89
society has a vital interest in fostering this dual affectional and therapeutic
relationship between parent and child. As in the marital and psychotherapeutic relationships, this optimal child-parent relationship cannot exist without a
great deal of communication between the two. 90 Such a relationship would be
characterized by a free flow of highly personal information from the child to
the parent. 91 Manifestly, the parent's disclosure of such information to a third
party, without the concurrence of the child, would deter continued communication between child and parent. Thus, the promise of confidentiality is a
necessary prerequisite to the satisfactory maintenance of the child-parent
relationship, just as it is to the presently privileged marital and psychotherapeutic relationships.
83. "IT]here is hardly any situation in the gamut of human relations where one human being is so
much subject to the scrutiny and mercy of another human being as in the psychodiagnostic and
psychotherapeutic relationships." Psychologist, supra note 64, at 745.
84. See note 79 supra and accompanying text.
85. M. Guttmacher & H. Weihofen, supra note 77, at 272 ("It would be too much to expect...
[patients to confide freely] if they knew that all they say-and all that the psychiatrist learns from
what they say-may be revealed to the whole world from a witness stand.".
86. See A. Skolnick, supra note 77, at 236-70.
87. See Pearce, Marriage,Parenting,and Productivity, in The Family 235 (P. Stein, J.Richman
& N. Hannon eds. 1977). It should be emphasized that this represents the ideal child-parent
relationship. See Birdwhistell, The Idealized Model of the American Family, in The Family 310(P.
Stein, J. Richman & N. Hannon, eds. 1977).
88. See notes 114-17 infra and accompanying text.
89. A. Coffey, The Prevention of Crime and Delinquency 56 (1975); J.Conger, Adolescence and
Youth 195-97 (2d ed. 1977). The important role which the family, and particularly the parent, plays
in the emotional development of the child has been recognized judicially on numerous occasions. See,
e.g., Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 844 (1977)
("[T]he importance of the familial relationship, to the individuals involved and to the society, stems
from the emotional attachments that derive from the intimacy of daily association, and from the role
it plays in 'promot[ing] a way of life' through the instruction of children .... .')(citation omitted);
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972) ("The history and culture of Western civilization reflect
a strong tradition of parental concern for the nurture and upbringing of their children. This primary
role of the parents in the upbringing of their children is now established beyond debate as an enduring
American tradition.').
90. See notes 114-15 infra and accompanying text.
91. See notes 128-29 infra and accompanying text.
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II. POLICY BASIS FOR THE CHILD-PARENT PRIVILEGE
Many forces shape the personality of the child and affect his development
into adulthood. Among the more obvious are biological factors, 92 economic
status, 93 educational opportunities and intellectual capabilities, 94 and the
influence on the child of peers and other members of the community. 95
Probably the most crucial factor, however, and the prime determinant of
whether a child ultimately becomes a healthy and functioning member of
society, is the type of relationship
he has with the other members of his family,
96
particularly his parents.
A. Family Interactionand Child Development
In most cases, the various members of the family, and particularly the
parent or parents, are the first individuals with whom the child has social
contact. 97 Throughout his developmental years the family continues to be the
primary shaper of the child's behavior patterns, values, attitudes, and goals.98
Whether the familial influence is positive or negative depends to a great extent
upon the quality and amount of interaction and communication between
parent and child. 99
The correlation between delinquent behavior and a lack of interaction and
affection within the family has been consistently demonstrated. 10 0 Studies
have shown that a significant number of juvenile delinquents come from
homes where there was inadequate interaction and little communication.10 1
One study of the family backgrounds of delinquent boys showed that the
strongest indicator of adolescent delinquency was the juvenile's relationship
with his family. 10 2 In fact, although the broken home was at one time
92. See generally S. Glueck & E. Glueck, Physique and Delinquency 217-48 (1956). Other
physiological theories of personality development include those which link heredity with a tendency
toward criminal behavior and those which have found a relationship between behavior and levels of
hormonal secretions. See A. Coffey, supra note 89, at 45-47.
93. See Rodman, Lower-Class Family Behavior, in Family in Transition 410 (A. Skolnick & J.
Skolnick eds. 1971). The author states that lower class families are more "fluid" than middle-class
ones, with higher rates of divorce, illegitimacy, and desertion. Id. at 413.
94. A. Coffey, supra note 89, at 70-74; J. Conger, supra note 89, at 362. See also Comment, The
Rights of Children: A Trust Model, 46 Fordham L. Rev. 669, 697-701 (1978).
95. See J. Conger, supra note 89 at 324-56; E. Douvan & J. Adelson, The Adolescent Experience
174, 228 (1966).
96. See note 89 supra and accompanying text.
97. D. Thomas, V. Gecas, A. Weigert & E. Rooney, Family Socialization and the Adolescent 111

(1974); R. Trojanowicz, Juvenile Delinquency Concepts and Control 68 (2d ed, 1978); Coburn,
supra note 20, at 616.
98. A. Coffey, supra note 89, at 56; J. Conger, supra note 89, at 195-96.
99. See notes 112-16 infra and accompanying text.
100. In describing delinquents as a group, one research team has isolated certain distinguishable
characteristics. Among them are similar sociological backgrounds "in having been reared ... in
homes of little understanding, affection, stability, or moral fibre by parents usually unfit to be
effective guides and protectors." S. Glueck &E. Glueck, Toward a Typology of Juvenile Offenders 2
(1970). See generally R. Trojanowicz, supra note 97, at 76.
101. Task Force on Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, Report 88 (1976); Furlong,
Youthful Marriageand Parenthood:A Threat to Family Stability, 19 Hastings L.J. 105, 115 (1967).
102. S.Glueck & E. Glueck, Delinquents and Nondelinquents in Perspective 9-10 (1968). The
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believed to be a prime cause of delinquency, 0 3 that theory has not been
wholly substantiated t0 4 and it has recently been suggested that "quarrelsome
and negligent homes" are a more significant factor than the mere fact of
divorce or parental desertion. 0 5 Thus, the way in which the family functions
is more important than its structure.
The obligation for providing discipline for the young has traditionally
rested with the parent' 0 6 and the child's need for this has been welldocumented.10 7 Discipline, however, may take many forms, and the type of
discipline a parent exerts may be more significant than the amount. Studies of
delinquent and nondelinquent families have concluded that the parents of
delinquents are likely to resort to physical punishment; those of nondelinquents are likely to reason with the child about misconduct.108 It would be
overly simplistic to conclude from these and similar studies' 0 9 that the
injudicious use of physical discipline causes juvenile delinquency, while
reasoning and communication prevent it."10 It seems clear, however, that the
form of discipline utilized by a parent is an important factor in the child's
emotional and moral development.
The causes of delinquency are manifold and complex and a negative family
life is only one of many reasons why a child may exhibit delinquent behavior."' Positive family interaction, however, plays a more significant role in
the prevention of delinquency'" 2 and the promotion of a well-adjusted
child." 3 It is primarily for this reason that society has such a strong interest in
fostering open communication between parent and child. Studies demonstrate
that children raised by parents who emphasize two-way communication and
who involve the children in family decisions are well-adjusted and have a
authors also found that boys coming from homes marked by a lack of family cohesiveness and poor
supervision and discipline had a nine in ten chance of becoming delinquents. S. Glueck & E. Glueck,
Toward a Typology of Juvenile Offenders 55-57 (1970). See also R. Trojanowicz, supra note 97,
at 68-72.
103. E.g., Wirt & Briggs, Personality and Environmental Factors in the Development of
Delinquency, 73 Psychological Monographs 1 (1959); see A. Coffey, supra note 89, at 44 (1975).
104. It is clear, however, that there is a statistical relationship between broken homes and
adolescent maladjustment. See, e.g., W. Ahistrom & A. Navighurst, 400 Losers 44-45 (1971); S.
Glueck & E. Glueck, Delinquents and Nondelinquents in Perspective 12-13 (1968).
105. H. Sandhu, Juvenile Delinquency, Causes, Control, and Prevention 52 (1977); see J.
Conger, supra note 89, at 584.
106. W. Tiffany, Persons and Domestic Relations 34043 (3d ed. 1921); Hafen, Puberty, Privacy
and Protection: The Risks of Children's "Rights", 63 A.B.A. J. 1383, 1388 (1977); See also W.
Prosser, Law of Torts § 27 (4th ed. 1971) (parent's right to use corporal punishment to discipline and
control his child).
107. See, e.g., A. Coffey, supra note 89, at 60-63.
108. See, e.g., S. Glueck & E. Glueck, Delinquents and Nondelinquents in Perspective 15-16
(1968); Whelan, An Experiment in Predicting Delinquency, 45 J. Crim. L.C. & P.S. 432, 432-41
(1954).
109. See generally R. Trojanowicz, supra note 97, at 78-80 (summarizing studies showing that
physical or erratic disciplinary practices contribute to delinquent behavior).
110. For discussions of the various social, psychological, physical, and cultural theories of
delinquency, see A. Coffey, supra note 89, at 26-50; H. Sandhu, supra note 105, at 33-64.
111. H. Sandhu, supra note 105, at 33-64.
112. A. Coffey, supra note 89, at 56.
113. See note 116 infra and accompanying text.
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positive self-image."14 In one study, it was found that democratic and
permissive parents who accompany their rules of conduct with frequent
explanations were most likely to have confident, independent children. Con-

versely, adolescents lacking in self-confidence were most likely to be raised by

autocratic, noncommunicative parents."15 Similarly, other studies have conby emotionally supportive parents possess high
cluded that adolescents raised
1 16
self-esteem and confidence.
It is thus clear that there is a correlation between a child's self-image and
emotional health on the one hand and a close, communicative family structure
on the other. Guidance and discipline in the form of reasoning and interaction
seem to produce a more well-adjusted child than dictatorial parental practices. Thus, there is a therapeutic element in child-parent communications
which, though perhaps not as pervasive as in the psychotherapist-patient
nevertheless plays a vitally important role in the child's
relationship,
7

"
growth. 1

The role that a parent, or in some cases the entire family, can play in the
therapeutic process, either alone" 8 or in conjunction with a professional, has
received growing recognition in recent years." 9 An increasing number of
social workers and psychologists, especially when treating children, are
involving the entire family in the treatment.120 This trend is reflected in a
number of jurisdictions in which the psychotherapist-patient privilege encompasses not only communications between the two parties directly involved in
the treatment, but also communications between the therapist and members
of the patient's family. '21 Moreover, a California court recently held that even
in the absence of statutory inclusion, statements by parents to a psychiatrist
114. In one survey of attitudes of children toward their parents, 85% of those raised under
democratic practices considered their parents' ideas of how they should behave to be reasonable and
fair. Elder, Structural Variations in the Child Learning Relationship, 25 Sociometry 241, 258
(1962). Those parents using autocratic methods ranked lowest. Id. In the same study, adolescents
were asked whether they ever felt unwanted. Again, about 40% of those raised by autocratic
parents responded positively as compared with only 10% of those reared under a democratic
structure and 11% of those reared under a permissive structure. Id. at 259.
115. Elder, Parental Power Legitimation and Its Effect on the Adolescent, 26 Sociometry 50
(1963).
116. D. Thomas, V. Gecas, A. Weigert & E. Rooney, Family Socialization and the Adolescent
61 (1974).
117. Coburn,supra note 20, at 615, 618-21. The author notes that the juvenile court system In tile
United States has traditionally been based upon the idea that confession of wrongful conduct has
great therapeutic value for the child. Id. at 620-21. The theory is that the child can be effectively
treated only after he has admitted his involvement in criminal activity. Id. See also Note, Rights and
Rehabilitation in the Juvenile Courts, 67 Colum. L. Rev. 281, 331 (1967). Similar benefits may
accrue whether the confession is made to a juvenile court judge or to a parent.
118. "[G]reat therapeutic contributions may... be made by friends [and] relatives." Rosenhelm,
supra note 18, at 670.
119. See Haley, A Review of the Family Therapy Field, in Intimacy, Family and Society 60 (A.
Skolnick & J. Skolnick eds. 1974).
120. Eisenman, The Origins and Practiceof Family Therapy, in The Family 135, 141-43 (P.
Stein, S. Richman & N. Hannon eds. 1977).
121. E.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 52-146d to-146e (West Supp. 1978); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 51, §
5.2 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1978).
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regarding the dangerous propensities of their daughter were within the
purview of the psychotherapist-patient privilege.1 2 2 At least one statute grants
a privilege to participants in group therapy sessions,1 23 and the recognition of
a privilege for marriage and family counselors 124 obviously implies that
confidences divulged in front of family members will be privileged. Similarly,
statutes granting a privilege to a child and a school guidance counselor, which
permit waiver only with the consent of the parent, 12 necessarily contemplate
the parent's involvement in the child's discussions with the counselor. These
provisions signify the importance of involving the entire family in the therapeutic process.
The parental role as a provider of guidance and discipline can only be
26
fulfilled if the child feels that he can rely on his parents for help and advice.'
Effective guidance, like effective therapy, cannot take place in a vacuum; the
parent must have some knowledge of his child's problems before he can
provide meaningful help.' 2 7 This knowledge can only arise if there is open
communication within the family. The child must feel that the parent can be
trusted, 28 and the graver the problem, the more essential the element of
trust becomes. In his home, more than anywhere else, the child should be
encouraged to communicate freely and should be made to feel that what he
has shared with his parent in confidence will not be disclosed to outsiders. 17 9
Without the promise of confidentiality, however, child-parent interaction will
necessarily be inhibited and the parent will be unable to provide salutary
guidance and support. At a time when the demise of the family is being both
122. Grosslight v. Superior Court, 72 Cal. App. 3d 502, S08, 140 Cal. Rptr. 278, 281 (1977).
123. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-90-107(g) (1973 & Supp. 1976).
124. Cal. Evid. Code §§ 1010(e), 1014 (West Supp. 1979).
125. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 600.2165 (1968) (privilege can be waived by parent without
minor's consent) (Supp. 1977); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 24, § 13-1319 (Purdon Supp. 1978) (same).
126. See Coburn, supra note 20, at 618-19.
127. A parent should be familiar with certain aspects of his child's life, for instance, the child's
activities and associates. In addition, the parent should be aware of his location. A. Coffey, supra
note 89, at 62.
128. See J. Conger, supra note 89, at 220.
129. One writer has stated, referring to the psychotherapist-patient relationship, that "the
condition for such openness is the guarantee that whatever is presented to the other or others is
disclosed in privacy." Journard, Sone Psychological Aspects of Privacy, 31 J. Law & Contemp.
Prob. 307, 311 (1966). Of course, the parent is not a substitute for, and will not always perform a
function identical to, the psychotherapist. A patient may reveal more in analysis than he wouldto the
closest members of his family. Slovenko, supra note 7, at 184-85. Nevertheless, communication,
trust, and parental guidance are integral parts of the process of emotional nurturing and are
extremely important for the development of a psychologically healthy adulL See notes 114-17
supra and accompanying text. In fact, there may be a danger in placing too much reliance on the
social worker or psychotherapist. A parent may substitute the judgment of the professional in
place of his own, preferring to rely upon the psychologist to solve child-parent conflicts. A.
Coffey, supra note 89, at 58. The parent may then become reluctant to assume responsibility over
his child's behavior. Id. at 58-59. One writer has stated that the primary role of the professional
"should not be to work with the children themselves but to help create the kind of conditions and
situations in which parents and others who carry the responsibility for the day-to-day care of
children can function effectively as human beings." Bronfenbrenner, Who Cares for America's
Children?, in The Future of the Family 139, 149 (L. Howe ed. 1972).
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predicted and decried, 1 3 0 it seems anamolous to deny child-parent communications the same protection as is granted to communications arising out of
other socially beneficial relationships.
The Marital Confidential Communications and ProposedChild-Parent
Privileges: Criticisms and Justifications
Because the proposed privilege is based in part upon the rationale which
supports the marital confidential communications privilege-that of fostering
open communication and interaction 13 -and because the child-parent relationship, like that of husband and wife, is a nonprofessional one, many of the
criticisms of the confidential communications privilege are also applicable to
the child-parent privilege. Perhaps the predominant argument against the
husband-wife confidential communications privilege is that it will have no
effect upon the average marital relationship since "in all likelihood" the
parties are unaware of its existence.1 32 On the other hand, critics argue, the
professional relationships generally involve one party-the practitioner-who
33
probably is aware of the privilege and will so inform his client or patient. 1
If one accepts this proposition, it is obviously applicable to all nonprofessional relationships, including that of parent and child. The presumption of
ignorance on the part of married people, however, has never been substantiated. 1 3 4 Furthermore, even if only a small segment of the married population is aware of the privilege, the state policy of fostering open communication
is furthered as to them.
Even assuming that most families would be unaware of a child-parent
privilege prior to a court appearance, its absence would certainly have an
adverse effect upon the child who learns firsthand that his parent can be
compelled to reveal any intimate conversations they may have had. 135 Inevitably, the child will feel betrayed and this feeling may be only slightly
diminished by the knowledge that his parent's act of disclosure is not
voluntary.1 36 Ironically, the juvenile accused of some crime or delinquent
B.

130. Keller, Does the Family Have a Future?, in The Family, Functions, Conflicts and Symbols
422 (P. Stein, J. Richman & N. Hannon eds. 1977).
131. Compare note 51 supra with note 117 supra and accompanying texts.
132. Proposed Fed. R. of Evid. 505, Advisory Comm. Note, 56 F.R.D. 245, 246 (1972); see
Hutchins & Slesinger, supra note 56, at 682; Evidentiary Privileges, supra note 37, at 428; Marital
Privilege, supra note 14, at 319.
133. Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 505, Advisory Comm. Note, 56 F.R.D. 245, 246 (1972).
134. The argument was originally advanced in 1929. Hutchins & Slesinger, supranote 56, at 682.
The authors, however, cited no authority for their proposition. Id. Moreover, even if the statement
was true in 1929, it is likely that a greater percentage of the populace in today's litigious society Is
aware of the existence of a privilege. See Reutlinger, supra note 8, at 1374.
135. Speaking of the marital privilege, one writer has noted that it is "the litigants of the world
. who encounter [the existence or non-existence of a pnvilegel in its most stark and meaningful
terms." Reutlinger, supra note 8, at 1377.
136. Compelled parental disclosure may cause more damage to the child-parent relationship
than compelled spousal disclosure would cause to the marital relation. A younger child especially
may not fully comprehend that his parent is being forced to testify and may feel that the parent, who,
at the time the confidence was revealed by the child, explicitly or implicitly promised to maintain
secrecy, has lied to him. Such a belief may have far-reaching adverse effects on the entire relationship. See R. Trojanowicz, supra note 97, at 90.
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behavior who suffers the airing of his confidential statements is likely to be
the one most in need of parental guidance and family interaction.' 37 Yet, it is
this child who, as a result of his experience, will be unlikely to seek parental
solace again. If he had not previously considered the possibility of compelled
parental disclosure, he will most certainly be cognizant of it in the future.
Another frequent criticism of the marital confidential communications
privilege which could be asserted against the child-parent privilege is that the
existence of a statute, even if known to those protected by it, will not
appreciably increase communication in a family in which trust and openness
do not already exist. 13 8 In other words, that which encourages spouses or
children "to fullest frankness is not the assurance of a courtroom privilege,
39
but the trust they place in the loyalty and discretion of each other."1
This argument is irrefutable as far as it goes. It is highly unlikely that a
person will divulge his secrets to spouse or parent because he knows that they
will be safe from disclosure in a courtroom.' 4 0 The argument, however, fails to
take into account the vital role the privileges play in preserving an existing
relationship.' 41 The rationale of preserving family harmony and preventing
dissension is generally applied only to the marital privilege against adverse
testimony and not to the confidential communications privilege.' 42 Yet, it
would seem to be an equally valid justification for both.' 43 Although the
confidential communications privilege is not primarily designed to exclude
adverse testimony, from a practical standpoint such a privilege is most likely to
be invoked when the communication sought to be disclosed is in some way
incriminating to the communicating party.44 Similarly, cases in which childparent confidential communications privileges have been asserted have also
primarily involved communications which were adverse to the interests of the
137. As discussed earlier, studies of the families of delinquents have shown that, in many
cases, there is little interaction between child and parent. See notes 100-08 supra and accompanying text. Generally, the delinquent child has not received proper affection, socialization, and
supervision. S. Glueck & E. Glueck, Family Environment and Delinquency 137-40 (1962). It
would seem that the juvenile offender, possibly even more than the nondelinquent, needs the
support of his parent; "[ulltimately, the rehabilitation of an individual may depend more upon the
support and concern of his family than on any other one factor." A. Coffey, supra note 89. at 185.
Families in which such parental concern is present, as manifested by the child turning naturally
to his parent for support and advice during his exigency, should not be disrupted by subsequently
forcing the parent to betray his child's confidences. E.g., In re A & M, 61 A.D.2d 426, 429, 403
N.Y.S.2d 375, 378 (1978).
138. C. McCormick, supra note 6, § 86, at 172; 8 J. Wigmore. supra note 3. § 2332, at 642;
MaritalPrivilege, supra note 14, at 318.
139. C. McCormick, supra note 6, § 86, at 173.
140. Id.
141. Mullen v. United States, 263 F.2d 275, 280 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (Fahy, J., concurring). Seealso
Privileges Today, supra note 8, at 110; Testimonial Non-Disclosure, supra note 37, at 219
142. See note 43 supra and accompanying text.
143. See Reutlinger, supra note 8, at 1369-71. Contra, Proposed Fed. R. Evid. R 505, 56
F.R-D. 245, 245-46 (1972) ("The traditional justifications for privileges not to testify against a
spouse and not to be testified against by one's spouse . . . bear no relevancy to marital
communications."). Critics of the adverse testimony privilege have suggested that the rationale
for preserving family harmony would be better served by encompassing all family members
within the privilege. See Hutchins & Slesinger, supra note 56, at 677; Evidentiary Privileges,
supra note 37, at 427.
144. 8J. Wigmore, supra note 3, § 2333, at 644;EvidentiarvPrivileges, supra note 37, at 417
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child. 145 Revelations of these intimate communications may have a very negative impact upon a pre-existing family relationship. 14 6 In fact, the most salient
effect of both the marital confidential communications privilege and childparent privilege is not so much that they encourage open communication
(although this may well be true in some instances), but that they protect the
confidentiality of a communication once it has been made. 147 If it is accepted
that the state and society in general have a strong interest in preserving and
fostering the child-parent relationship, 148 then it must be recognized that
compelling disclosure of a child's confidences runs directly counter to this
interest. What the privilege protects is not only the expectation of privacy, that
is, the encouragement of confidential
communications, but the privacy of the
149
family relationship itself.
Another justification generally asserted in support of the marital privilege for
adverse testimony, but not usually advanced as a rationale for the confidential
communications privilege, is that society experiences a "natural repugnance"
at the thought of forcing one spouse to incriminate the other. 5 Yet, since
incrimination is often the end result of compelled disclosure of confidential
communications, 15 1 the repugnancy rationale is also applicable to those situations. 1 5 2 Moreover, even if disclosure would not be directly harmful to a claim
or defense of the communicating party, the idea of forcing one spouse to divulge
confidences entrusted to him by the other is certainly
as "repugnant" to public
1 3
sensibilities as compelled adverse testimony.'
It is obvious that compelling a parent to reveal his child's secrets is no less
offensive than compelled spousal disclosure.' 5 4 In fact, one of the harshest
145. E.g., In re Terry W., 59 Cal. App. 3d 745, 130 Cal. Rptr. 913 (1976) (juvenile sought to
exclude testimony of mother regarding confession of guilt made to her); In re Mark G., - A.D.2d
-,
410 N.Y.S.2d 464 (1978) (juvenile sought to exclude father's testimony regarding juvenile's
admission of guilt); In re A & M, 61 A.D. 2d 426, 403 N.Y.S.2d 375 (1978) (parents refused to
testify as to alleged admissions of guilt made to them by their son).
146. See notes 126-30 supra and accompanying text.
147. See Mullen v. United States, 263 F.2d 275, 280 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (Fahy, J., concurring);
Testimonial Non-Disclosure, supra note 37, at 219.
148. See note 89 supra and accompanying text. T'e importance of preserving the family
relationship has received judicial recognition in a long line of cases. E.g., Smith v. Organization of
Foster Families for Equality and Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 844 (1977); Moore v. City of E. Cleveland,
431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974); Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972); Stanley v. Illinois,
405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968); Prince v. Massachusetts,
321 U.S. 158, 166 (1943); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
149. See PrivilegesToday, supra note 8, at 110-11.
150. 8. J. Wigmore, supra note 3, § 2228, at 217-18; see note 44 supra and accompanying text.
But see C. McCormick, supra note 6, § 86, at 173 (policy underlying the confidential communications privilege is not the encouraging of confidences but rather "a feeling of indelicacy and want of
decorum in prying into the secrets of husband and wife").
151. See note 144 supra and accompanying text.
152. See Reutlinger, supra note 8, at 1369-70; Testimonial Non-Disclosure, supra note 37,
at 218-19. Contra, Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 505, Advisory Comm. Note, 56 F.R.D. 245, 247
(1972).
153. See Policy, Privacy and Prerogatives, supra note 8, at 1370.
154. In re A& M, 61 A.D.2d 426, 433, 403 N.Y.S.2d 375, 380(1978). It has been suggested that
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critics of the adverse testimony privilege has suggested that the repugnancy
rationale would make more sense if the privilege encompassed the testimony of
parents, children, and siblings, as well as that of husband and wife. 15s Although
the repugnancy rationale has been dismissed by critics as sentimental, s 6
speculative, 15 7 and not sufficiently important to overcome the needs of state
and litigants for disclosure of relevant evidence,158 it is suggested that there is a
great deal more than indecorum involved when disclosure of intimate family
confidences is compelled. 159 At stake is no less than the right of a family to
maintain its inviolability and integrity.1 60 At the least, compelled parental
disclosure will result in strained relations, not only between the child and the
parent who revealed his secrets,' 6 ' but among the entire family. The extent and
duration of the breakdown in intrafamilial interaction will vary from family to
family depending upon such factors as its inherent stability,' 62 the age of the
child,' 63 the subject matter of the communication disclosed, 164 and the type of
proceeding in which testimony is given. 165 In almost every case, however, some
compelling a parent to reveal his child's incriminating statements indirectly violates the child's
constitutional privilege against self-incrimination, "solely because of a natural, but regrettably
mistaken belief on his part that his conversations with his parents are private." Coburn, supra note
20, at 600; cf. id. at 617 ("This method of circumventing a juvenile's privilege against selfincrimination is repugnant to our system of justice and fair play.").
155. 8 J. Wigmore, supra note 3, § 2228, at 217 n.2.
156. C. McCormick, supra note 6, § 86, at 173; 8 J. \\igmore, supra note 3, § 2228, at 217.
157. Evidentiary Privileges, supra note 37, at 427.
158. C. McCormick, supra note 6, § 86 at 173; 8 J. Wigmore, supra note 3, § 2228, at 217-18.
159. 8 J. Wigmore, supra note 3, § 2228, at 217.
160. In re A & M, 61 A.D. 2d 426, 432-33, 403 N.Y.S. 2d 375, 380 (1978); see notes 286-91 infra
and accompanying text.
161. See notes 128-30 supra and accompanying text.
162. For example, parents using democratic methods of childrearing where interaction between
family members is consistently encouraged may be better able than authoritarian parents to regain
the trust of the child whose confidences have been divulged. See notes 114-16 supra and accompanying text.
163. See note 136 supra and accompanying text.
164. The degree of family disruption resulting from compelled disclosure may depend upon how
embarrassing or harmful the particular communication was to the child. When divulgence would
directly implicate the child in a crime, see, e.g., In re A & M, 61 A.D. 2d 426, 403 N.VS. 2d 375
(1978), the effects of parental testimony on the family may be more severe than in situations when
less intimate matters are disclosed. See, e.g., In re Kinoy, 326 F. Supp. 400, 406 (S.D.N.Y. 1970)
(testimony was sought from a father regarding the whereabouts of his daughter when the
daughter was not herself a target of the grand jury's investigation).
165. Family dissension may be more severe in criminal, delinquency, or grand jury investigations where the child is suspected or accused of involvement in criminal activity and parental
disclosure may directly incriminate him. See, e.g., In re Terry W., 59 Cal. App. 3d 745, 130 Cal.
Rptr. 913 (1976) (juvenile delinquency proceeding); Cissna v. State, - Ind. App. -, 352 N.E. 2d
793 (1976) (criminal proceeding); In re Mark G., - A.D. 2d -, 410 N.Y.S. 2d 464 (1978)
(juvenile delinquency proceeding); In re A & M, 61 A.D. 2d 426, 403 N.Y.S. 2d 375 (1978) (grand
jury investigation). In recognition of the fact that the potential for serious harm to family relations
is greatest where disclosure is compelled in criminal, rather than civil cases, some states recognize
the marital privilege for adverse testimony only in criminal cases where one spouse is the accused.
E.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-4062(l) (1978); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 20-4-505(a) (Supp. 1975); Tex.
Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.11 (Vernon 1966 & Supp. 1966-1978); accord, Proposed Fed. IL of
Evid. 505, Advisory Comm. Note, 56 F.R.D. 245, 245-46 (1972).
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degree of harm seems inevitable, and in many families future communication
may be permanently deterred.
In formulating a privilege, it is not enough merely to demonstrate that
compelled disclosure will lead to a deterioration of the socially desirable childparent relation. The potential for harm must be weighed against the public
1 66
particularly in criminal cases. 167
need for disclosure of all relevant evidence,
It is indisputable that the production of facts is central to the proper functioning
of the adversary system. 168 Yet, in a practical sense, the benefits accruing to the
adjudicatory process in the absence of a privilege may be minimal; even
without a privilege the court may be denied the testimony. A parent called
upon to testify has several courses of action open to him. First, he can comply
with the request for disclosure. 169 Second, he can refuse to testify, either
flatly170 or by claiming a privilege. 171 A flat refusal will obviously subject him

to a contempt citation, and the chances for a successful assertion of a privilege
seem slim in light of the historic reluctance on the part of most courts to
recognize privileges in the absence of statutory authorization. 172 Finally, the
parent can 7lie3 or conveniently forget, and accept the possibility of a perjury
conviction. '

Although it is probably impossible to ascertain how many parents have
chosen or would choose the second or third alternative, it does not seem
unreasonable to assume that many would find the first choice to be a morally
unacceptable one, particularly if there was a chance that by testifying the
parent would become the instrument of his child's conviction. Choosing the
second alternative would not aid the disposal of the litigation, for if the parent
refuses to answer questions despite the threat of contempt, no evidence can be
obtained from him. That the third alternative will not further adjudication is
obvious; in fact, it has been suggested by some commentators that privileges
166. See notes 4-8 supra and accompanying text.
167. Although the potential for harm to a privileged relationship may be greater in criminal or
grand jury proceedings, the need for disclosure of relevant evidence is also usually deemed to be more
compelling. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709(1974); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665,
686-88(1972); United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331(1950); McMann v. SEC, 87 F. 2d 377,378
(2d Cir. 1937).
168. See notes 1-3 supra and accompanying text.
169. Cf. Robinson, supra note 74, at 929 (one option open to a guidance counselor called upon to
testify regarding communications made to him by a counselee, would be to agree to testify, "if he
found that option to be morally and professionally acceptable"); Testimonial Non-Disclosure, supra
note 37, at 210 (one option open to a wife compelled to testify against her husband would be to
"testify, and possibly condemn her husband').
170. In re A & M, 61 A.D. 2d 426, 433, 403 N.Y.S. .d 375, 380 (1978) (discussing the risk of
prosecution for contempt if parents refuse to divulge their child's confidences); Coburn, supra note
20, at 629 (same); see Robinson, supra note 74, at 929 (same in context of guidance counselorcounselee relationship); UnderprivilegedCommunications,supra note 66, at 1054 (same in context of
social worker-patient relationship); Testimonial Non-Disclosure, supra note 37, at 210 (same In
context of marital relationship).
171. See Robinson, supra note 74, at 929, 932 (discussing this option in the context of counselor-pupil relationship).
172. See note 26 supra and accompanying text.
173. Inre A & M, 61 A.D. 2d 426, 433, 403 N.Y.S. 2d 375,380 (1978); Coburn, supra note 20, at
628; see Testimonial Non-Disclosure, supra note 37, at 210.
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actually aid the ascertainment of truth by decreasing the likelihood of perjury.1 7 4 Therefore, in the context of child-parent communications the state's
interest in compelled disclosure may not outweigh the societal benefit gained by
insulating the relationship.

II.

THE CHILD-PARENT PRIVILEGE AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF

PRIVACY

A.

Confidential Communications and the Right of Privacy

The concept of privacy-the individual's "right to be let alone"t 7 5 -has

emerged as a viable constitutional doctrine in the past century.'

76

Concomi-

tantly, there has been increasing recognition of the important role that privileges
may play in safeguarding this right.' 7 7 Courts and commentators have spoken

of preserving the inviolability of confidences,

178

protecting the right to be let

alone,
and the importance of the privileges to "human freedom."' 8 0 Therefore, certain privileges that preserve the confidentiality of communications
arising out of various relationships may be constitutionally mandated, possibly
8
assertable even in the absence of statute.'1
The right of privacy was elevated to the level of a constitutional guarantee in
Griswold v. Connecticut,' 8 2 in which the Supreme Court declared a Connecticut
statute forbidding the use of contraceptives to be an unconstitutional invasion
of the "zone of privacy" surrounding the marriage relationship., 83 Subsequent
cases have confirmed that this right of marital privacy is one aspect of a more
general right of privacy.1 8 4 After Griswold, the idea that confidential com17 9

174. Privileges Today, supra note 8, at 110; Testimonial Non-Disclosure,supra note 37, at 210
175. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,dissenting).
176. Perhaps the earliest delineation of privacy as a distinguishable right, the invasion of which
was compensable in tort, was formulated in 1888. T. Cooley, Torts 29 (2d ed. 1888); see Warren &
Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1890). In 1886, the Supreme Court recognized a
right of privacy in the fourth andfifth amendments. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616,630(1886).
Justice Brandeis' famous dissent in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), however, gave
the constitutional claim to privacy its widest currency. "[The Constitution's framers] conferred, as
against the Government, the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right
most valued by civilized men." Id. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
177. See Caesarv. Mountanos, 542 F.2d 1064, 1067-68(9th Cir. 1976).cert.denied, 430U_.5 954
(1977); Lorav. Board of Educ., 74 F.R.D. 565,574-76 (E.D.N.Y. 1977); United Statesex relEdney
v. Smith, 425 F. Supp. 1038, 1042-44 (E.D.N.Y. 1976), aft'd, 556 F.2d 556 (2d Cir. 1977); In re
Lifschutz, 2 Cal. 3d 415, 431-33, 467 P.2d 567-68, 85 Cal. Rptr. 829. 839-40 (1970).
178. Mullen v. United States, 263 F.2d 275, 280 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (Fahy, J.,concurring)
179. Privileges Today, supra note 8, at 110-11.
180. Psychologist, supra note 64, at 750.
181. Caesar v. Mountanos, 542 F.2d 1064, 1067-68 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.5. 954
(1977);Inre Lifschutz, 2 Cal. 3d415, 431, 467 P.2d 557, 567-68, 85 Cal. Rptr. 829,839-401970).
182. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
183. Id. at 485-86.
184. See, e.g., Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l., 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (rights of minors under
the age of 16 to purchase contraceptives); Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1971)
(right of choice in family living arrangements); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U S. 52, 74
(1976) (unmarried minor's right to consent to an abortion during the first trimester of pregnancy
without state interference in the form of an absolute parental consent requirement); Roe v Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973) (woman's right to consent to an abortion during the first trimester of
pregnancy without government approval); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U S. 438 t1972) (unmarried
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munications within certain relationships might be encompassed in the amorphous right of privacy began to crystallize. In particular, some commentators
have suggested that marital and physician-patient communications are constitutionally protected and that these privileges are therefore assertable even in
the absence of statute. 185 Such an approach, however, has been largely unexplored by the judiciary. Most courts, in analyzing whether the invocation of a
privilege in a particular situation is proper, merely examine the applicable
statutory privilege and its exceptions.1 8 6 The few cases that have discussed the
relationship between privileges and privacy have generally involved two types
of claims by litigants: that the right of privacy mandates recognition of a
privilege in the absence of statute 8 7 or that the right of privacy mandates
recognition of an absolute privilege and that any statutory exceptions are

therefore unconstitutional.18 8 Although claims of an absolute privilege have

been uniformly rejected,

89

some courts have indicated that certain confidential

communications would be entitled to constitutional protection even in the

absence of statute. 190 Other courts, however, have denied that the right of
privacy requires any recognition of a particular privilege.' 9'
The latter approach was adopted by the court in Felber v. Foote. 292 In
Felber, a physician sought an injunction against the enforcement of a Connecticut statute that required physicians to report to the state commissioner of
health information about patients believed by them to be drug-dependent. 193
The statute further provided that the reports would not be admissible in any
criminal prosecutions.' 94 The plaintiff claimed that the statute was an unconindividual's right to use contraceptives free from governmental interference); Stanley v. Georgia,
394 U.S. 557 (1969) (right to view pornography in the home).
185. See Proposed Fed. R. of Evid.: Hearings on H.R. 650 Before the Special Subcomm. on
Reform of Federal Criminal Laws of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 240
(1973) (letter from Charles L. Black, Jr.) (marital and physician-patient confidential communications); Policy, Privacy and Prerogatives,supra note 8, at 1356 n.9 (marital confidential communications). These constitutional arguments were raised in response to the elimination of both the
husband-wife and physician-patient confidential communications privileges from the proposed
Federal Rules of Evidence.
186. See note 26 supra and accompanying text.
187. See Felber v. Foote, 321 F. Supp. 85, 87 (D. Conn. 1970); In re A & M, 61 A.D.2d 426,
428, 403 N.Y.S.2d 375, 377 (1978).
188. Caesar v. Mountanos, 542 F.2d 1064, 1067 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 954
(1977); United States ex rel. Edney v. Smith 425 F. Supp. 1038, 1040 (E.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd, 556
F.2d 556 (2d Cir. 1977); In re Lifschutz, 2 Cal. 3d 415, 421, 467 P.2d 557, 560, 85 Cal. Rptr. 829, 832
(1970).
189. Caesar v. Mountanos, 542 F.2d 1064, 1068 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 954
(1977); United Statesex rel. Edney v. Smith, 425 F. Supp. 1038, 1044 (E.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd, 556
F.2d556 (2d Cir. 1977);lnre Lifschutz, 2 Cal. 3d415, 423,431-33, 467 P.2d 557,561,567-69, 85 Cal.
Rptr. 829, 833, 839-44 (1970).
190. Caesar v. Mountanos, 542 F.2d 1064, 1067 n.9 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 954
(1977); United States ex ret. Edney v. Smith, 425 F. Supp. 1038, 1043 (E.D.N.Y. 1976), qff'd, 556
F.2d 556 (2d Cir. 1977);Inre Lifschutz, 2 Cal. 3d415, 431, 467 P.2d 557, 567, 85 Cal. Rptr. 829, 839
(1970); In re A & M, 61 A.D.2d 426, 433-34, 403 N.Y.S.2d 375, 380 (1978).
191. Felber v. Foote, 321 F. Supp. 85, 87 (D. Conn. 1970).
192. 321 F. Supp. 85 (D. Conn. 1970).
193. Id. at 86.
194. Id. at 86 n.2.
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stitutional invasion of his own privacy rights as a physician as well as the rights
of all other "practitioners of the healing arts" and their patients. 95 At that
time, Connecticut had no general physician-patient privilege,1 96 but did have
a psychotherapist-patient privilege which protected confidential communica197
tions and records of mental patients.
The court held that the statute did not invade the privacy rights of either
physician or patient. 198 As to the physician's claim of privacy within the
physician-patient relationship, the court stated that Griswold's recognition of a
right of privacy protected only "the sanctity of the family" and did not include
other relationships within its penumbra. 99 Indeed, the court denied the existence of a broad constitutional right of privacy 20 0 and rejected the idea of
a constitutional foundation for the physician-patient privilege which would
enable the patient to assert a privilege in the absence of statute. 2 0 ' Consequently, whether a patient's communications to his doctor could be protected
from disclosure would depend solely upon the existence or nonexistence of a
20 2
statutory privilege.
The same year in which the Felber court concluded that no privacy rights
were involved in the physician-patient privilege, the California Supreme
Court, in In re Lifschutz, 2 0 3 reached the opposite conclusion in the context of
the psychotherapist-patient relationship.2 0 4 Unlike the situation in Felber,
however, there was an applicable statutory privilege which, in the absence of
waiver, would have been assertable by a patient or his psychotherapist on his
behalf. 20 5 At issue in Lifschutz was the constitutionality of the statutory
patient-litigant exception which provided that a patient who places his emotional condition in issue in a civil or criminal proceeding automatically waives
20 6
the privilege.
195. Id. at 87. The court did not discuss the issue of the physician's standing to raise the
constitutional rights of his patients. Id.
196. Id. at 88 n.8. Connecticut presently recognizes privileges for communications between
psychologists and patients, Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 52-146c (West Supp. 1979) and psychiatrists
and patients, id. §§ S2-146d to -146j (West Supp. 1979), but still has no general physician-patient
privilege.
197. 321 F. Supp. at 88 n.8. The court stated that the statutory privilege could be asserted only by

the patient for whose benefit the privilege existed. Thus, it could not be invoked by Dr. Felber. Id. In
some states, the applicable statutory privilege specifically allows the psychotherapist to claim the
privilege on his patient's behalf. See, e.g., Cal. Evid. Code § 1014(b) (West Supp. 1979); Ill.
Stat.
Ann. ch. 51, § 5.2 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1978).

198. 321 F. Supp. at 87-89.
199. Id. at 88-89. It should be noted that Felber was decided before many of the more recent
Supreme Court cases which have broadened the right of privacy beyond the parameters of marriage
and family relations. See cases cited note 184 supra.
200. 321 F. Supp. at 88. The court noted that the plaintiff had not claimed that the statute
constituted an unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the fourth amendment. Had he done
so, however, he would not have prevailed because the statutory provision forbidding disclosure of the

reports in criminal proceedings provided "built-in fourth amendment protection." Id.
201. Id. at 87.
202. Id. at 88.
203.
204.
205.
206.

2 Cal.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

3d 415, 467 P.2d 557, 85 Cal. Rptr. 829 (1970).
431, 467 P.2d at 567, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 839.
421, 467 P.2d at 559-60, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 831-32.
422-23, 467 P.2d at 561, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 833. The patient-litigant exception to
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In Lifschutz, a psychiatrist sought to secure his release from prison where he
had been confined after refusing to comply with a court order to answer
questions and produce records regarding a former patient. 20 7 The patient had
instituted an action for civil assault alleging, among other things, that he had
suffered emotional distress. 20 His deposition revealed that ten years earlier he
had received psychiatric treatment from Dr. Lifschutz. 2 0 9 Defendant sought
the records and testimony from Lifschutz, but the latter repeatedly refused to
comply with the request, even after the trial court ordered compliance, holding
that the plaintiff had automatically waived the statutory psychotherapistpatient privilege by placing his mental
condition in issue. Lifschutz was held in
21 0
contempt and was incarcerated.

Dr. Lifschutz contended that the court order was an unconstitutional infringement of his personal rights of privacy, his right to practice his profession
effectively, and his patients' privacy rights. 21 1 He claimed that Griswold mandated recognition of an absolute constitutional right for psychotherapists to
refuse to disclose statements made in the context of the psychotherapist-patient
relationship and that the legislative exceptions to the privilege were therefore
unconstitutional. 2 12 The court held that the statutory patient-litigant exception
did not infringe upon the privacy rights of either psychotherapists 213 or their
patients. 21 4 Nevertheless, the court went on to state in dictum that, although
not absolute, a patient does have an assertable right of privacy which protects
confidences revealed in psychotherapy. 21 5 In fact, if he had not placed his
California's psychotherapist-patient privilege, Cal. Evid. Code § 1016 (West 1966 & Supp. 1978), is
typical of those in other jurisdictions that recognize the privilege. See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §
52-146c (West Supp. 1979) (patient-litigant exception in psychologist-patient privilege applicable to
civil proceedings); id. § 52-146f(e) (patient-litigant exception in psychiatrist-patient privilege applicable in civil proceedings); Ill. Stat. Ann. ch. 51, § 5.2(c) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1978) (patient-litigant
exception in psychiatrist-patient privilege applicable in (ivil and administrative proceedings).
207. 2 Cal. 3d at 420-21, 467 P.2d at 559-60, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 831-32.
208. Id. at 420, 467 P.2d at 559, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 831.
209. Id. at 420-21, 467 P.2d at 559-60, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 831-32.
210. Id. at 421, 467 P.2d at 560, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 832.
211. Id. at 420, 467 P.2d at 559, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 831. Lifschutz based his standing to assert the
constitutional rights of his patients on the decision in Griswold, in which the Court allowed a
physician to assert the rights of his patients. 381 U.S. at 481. The Lifschutz court distinguished
Griswold, however, on two grounds, and stated that it would be "inappropriate" to allow Lifschutz to
assert his patients' rights. 2 Cal. 3d at 423 n.4, 467 P.2d at 561 n.4, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 833 n.4. First, the
psychiatrist's and patient's wishes might not always coincide on the issue of whether to disclose
communications. Id. Second, whereas in Griswold the married couples were not in a position to
assert their own rights, here the patient himself had had "full opportunity" to do so, because he was a
party in the original action. Id.
212. 2 Cal. 3d at 423-24, 467 P.2d at 561-62, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 833-34.
213. Id. at 423-24, 467 P.2d at 561-62, 85 Cal. Rptr at 833-34. Disclosure would not violate
any privacy rights of the psychotherapist because "[it is the depth and intimacy of the patients'
revelations that give rise to the concern over compelled disclosure: the psychotherapist . . . does
not exert a significant privacy interest separate from his patient." Id. at 424, 467 P.2d at 562, 85
Cal. Rptr. at 834 (emphasis and footnote omitted).
214. Id. at 433, 467 P.2d at 568, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 8,10-41. Although the court had denied
Lifschutz standing to raise the rights of his patients, see note 211 supra, it embarked on an extensive
discussion of the privacy rights of the patient. See notes 215-17 infra and accompanying text.
215. 2 Cal. 3d at431-33, 467 P.2d at 567-69, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 839-41. Because the court found the
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emotional condition in issue and thus triggered the statutory exception, the
patient's communication could have had constitutional protection in addition to
or in spite of any statutory rules of evidence. 2 1 6 Although the Griswold decision
was not deemed to be controlling, the court noted its open-ended quality and
extended17the zone of marital privacy recognized there to the psychotherapeutic
2
session.

Lifschutz was followed by the Ninth Circuit's decision in Caesarv. Mountanos,2 18 in which the California statutory patient-litigant exception was again
challenged by a psychiatrist on constitutional grounds.2 19 The court agreed that
a right of privacy encompasses the psychotherapist-patient relationship 220 but
stated, as in Lifschutz, that this did not provide the psychiatrist with an
absolute right of nondisclosure. 2 2 1 Basing its analysis upon Roe v. Wade22 2 and
Doe v. Bolton, 223 the court stated that the right of privacy inherent in the
psychotherapist-patient relationship, although fundamental, is not absolute but
rather conditional, and can be regulated by the state upon a showing of a
compelling state interest.22 4 Holding the state's interest in insuring the ascertainment of truth in the instant legal proceedings to be compelling, 22 s the court
concluded that the patient-litigant exception did
not violate the constitutional
22 6
rights of either patient or psychotherapist.
The Caesarcourt thus further defined the exact limitations of the right of
privacy inherent in the psychotherapist-patient relationship. The court accepted without discussion the constitutional protection afforded the relationship;2 27 but stated that a state may nevertheless intrude into the
privacy right of the patient to be a qualified one, it concluded that not all state interference with it is
prohibited. Id. at 432, 467 P.2d at 568, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 840.
216. Id. at 431-32, 467 P.2d at 567-68, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 839-40. Even when the patient has
effected such awaiver, however, he would not completely abrogate his rights, but would waive them
merely to the extent that he had disclosed his mental condition by placing it in issue. Communications
not directly related to that mental condition presumably remain privileged. Id. at 435, 467 P.2d at
570, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 842. But see United States ex rel. Edney v. Smith, 425 F. Supp. 1038, 1044-46
(E.D.N.Y. 1976) (by asserting a defense of insanity the patient had effected a complete waiver of the
psychotherapist-patient privilege as well as any privacy rights he might have had within the
relationship), aff'd, 556 F.2d 556 (2d Cir. 1977).
217. 2 Cal. 3d at 432, 467 P.2d at 567-68, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 839-40.
218. 542 F.2d 1064 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 954 (1977).
219. Id. at 1065.
220. Id. at 1067 n.9.
221. Id. at 1068.
222. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). In Roe, the Court held that the "fundamental" right of privacy
precludes state interference with a woman's decision to obtain an abortion during the first trimester of
pregnancy. Id. at 153-56.
223. 410 U.S. 179 (1973). The Doe Court held that a woman's constitutional right to obtain an
abortion during the first trimester of pregnancy could not be infringed upon by a statute proscribing
abortions except when necessary in the "best judgment" of a licensed physician. Id. at 197. The
psychiatrist in Caesar claimed that the decisions in theRoe and Doe cases mandated a re-examination
of the decision in Lifschutz. 542 F.2d at 1067.
224. 542 F.2d at 1067-68.
225. Id. at 1069.
226. Id. at 1070.
227. Id. at 1067 n.9.
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psychotherapist-patient privilege when such intrusion is "properly justified." 228
Creating an exception to the privilege when the patient has made his emotional
condition an element of his claim or defense was deemed to be a justifiable
intrusion
in light of the state's "compelling" interest in the ascertainment of
29
truth.

2

The major issue unresolved by Lifschutz and Caesar is whether, in the
absence of waiver, the patient's right of privacy would outweigh the state's
interest in facilitating the ascertainment of truth. That this state interest is a
significant one is well established.2 30 The Lifschutz and Caesar cases suggest,
however, that a patient who had not placed his emotional condition in issue
would be able to claim a right of privacy to prevent disclosure of confidential
communications even in the absence of statute. 23' Thus, his right of privacy in
this situation would prevail over the competing state interest. Whether
confidential communications are entitled to constitutional protection is a question which arises not only in the context of the psychotherapist-patient relationship, but in other relationships which are arguably entitled to constitutional
232
protection, such as that between parent and child.
B.

Family Privacy and the Child-ParentPrivilege
1. The Judicial Response

Since 1923, the Supreme Court has recognized the family as an autonomous
unit entitled to constitutional protection from undue state regulation. 233 Cases
involving family life can be grouped into two broad categories: those involving
state interference with the physical structure or definition of the family 234 and
228. Id. at 1067.
229. Id. at 1069. The court agreed with Lifschutz that by placing his emotional condition in
issue, the patient waived the privilege only insofar as the condition he had disclosed. Id. at
1069-70.
230. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 66S, 700
(1972); Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 281 (1919). Furthermore, Supreme Court cases that have
held the right of privacy to be fundamental have also stated that it is not absolute, but can be
restricted upon a showing of a compelling state interest. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155
(1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 447 n.7 (1972); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564
(1969).
231. See notes 215-17, 220 supra and accompanying text.
232. See notes 27-34 supra and accompanying text.
233. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). In Meyer, the Court overturned a state statute
prohibiting foreign language instruction in elementary schools. The Court upheld both the instructor's right to teach German and the parents' right to engage him to instruct their children. Id. at 400.
The parents' right "to marry, establish a home and bring up children" was held to arise out of the
liberty guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 399.
234. See Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816 (1977)
(pre-removal hearings are not constitutionally mandated when children living in foster homes for less
than 18 months are returned to their natural parents as opposed to another foster home); Moore v.
City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (city housing ordinance requiring single family dwellings
and limiting definition of family to a few related individuals held unconstitutional); Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (a state has no authority to interfere with the custody rights of an unwed
father absent a finding of neglect on his part); Glona v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73
(1968) (state's definition of family in wrongful death statute which barred a mother from recovering
for the death of her illegitimate son held unconstitutional); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968)
(same wrongful death statute held unconstitutional as applied to prohibit illegitimate child from
maintaining an action for the death of his mother).
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those involving the right to make certain decisions relating to various aspects of
family life such as marriage, 235 procreation, 236 contraception, 2 37 and the upbringing of children. 238 These cases provide support, either implicitly or
explicitly, for what has now become a well-known maxim-that there is a
"private realm of family life which the state cannot enter. ' 239
The zone of privacy surrounding family life, however, can be encroached

upon if the state can demonstrate that its regulation serves a compelling state
interest. 240 The greater the intrusion upon freedom of choice in matters of
marriage and family life, the stronger the state interest must be. 24 1Whether the
private interests involved in a particular situation outweigh the public ones
242
necessitates an analysis of the competing interests.
Very few cases have dealt with the question of constitutional protection for
intrafamilial communications, either between husband and wife or parent and
child. Although the California courts have been in the forefront in recognizing
constitutional protections for patients' communications, ' 43 a claim by a
juvenile that intrafamilial conversations fell within "a penumbral right of
privacy" was denied by a California court in In re Terry WV.244 The juvenile had
235. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (statute which provided that unmarried
residents with obligation to support minor children not in their custody had to obtain a court order
before they could marry held to impinge unconstitutionally upon the fundamental right to mary);
Loving v. Vi-ginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (miscegenation statute invalidated on the ground that it
deprived a couple of the fundamental freedom to marry).
236. See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (a state cannot impose blanket
provisions requiring parental or spousal consent as a condition for an unwed minor or woman to
obtain an abortion in the first 12 weeks of pregnancy); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S.
632 (1974) (mandatory leave provisions for pregnant school teachers invalidated on the ground that
they unnecessarily interfered with the decision to raise a family); Roe v.Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)
(statute forbidding an abortion except to save the life of the mother violated the mother's fundamental
right of privacy).
237. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l., 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (statute prohibiting any sale or
distribution of contraceptives to minors under the age of 16 violated minors' right of privacy);
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (statute prohibiting distribution of contraceptives to single
persons violated the equal protection clause by distinguishing between provision of contraceptives to
married and unmarried individuals); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (statute forbidding the use of contraceptives held unconstitutional as applied to married persons).
238. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (compulsory education statute as applied to
Amish parents invalidated because parents' right to free exercise of religion and to rear their children
outweighed state's asserted interests in educating its children); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S.
510 (1925) (statute which barred children from attending private school invalidated because it denied
parents the liberty to direct the upbringing of their children); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923)
(statute barring foreign language instruction to school children invalidated).
239. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
240. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973). Thus, astate's independent interest in the
health, safety, and welfare of its children justifies statutes providing for removal of children from
their families in cases of abuse or neglect. See, e.g., Cal. welf. & Inst. Code § 300(d),
16500-16502.5 (West 1966 & Supp. 1979). A state may prohibit a woman from obtaining an
abortion after the first trimester of pregnancy, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), or enact
compulsory vaccination laws. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
241. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153-55 (1973).
242. Id.
243. See notes 203-29 supra and accompanying text.
244. 59 Cal. App. 3d 745, 748, 130 Cal. Rptr. 913, 914 (1976).
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made a confession to his mother regarding his involvement in a burglary; her
testimony to that effect was introduced at the boy's trial over the objection of
counsel. 245 On appeal, he argued, inter alia, that such compelled disclosure
was unconstitutional. 246 Although it conceded that the arguments for a childparent statutory privilege were "persuasive", the court held
that the right of
24 7
privacy does not protect child-parent communications.
In its statement that "the 'penumbra' is limited to the relationship between
husband and wife,' 248 the Terry court seemingly ignored the conclusion of In
re Lifschut 249 that the right of privacy recognized in Griswold clearly encompassed patient-psychotherapist communications. 2 5 0 The court also failed to
consider all of the post-Griswold decisions which explicitly included within
their definitions of privacy matters relating to family life. 2S I Instead, it cited
several cases, none of which involved relationships within the traditional
family structure, in which privacy claims have been rejected by the Supreme
Court. 25 2 Moreover, the court noted that it would be "unwise" for "a court of
our level" to expand the right of privacy into the uncharted area of intrafamilial
communications. 25 3 As to the creation of an evidentiary privilege,
the court
2 4
stated that such action should be left to the legislature.
In direct contrast to Terry, the New York Appellate Division, in In re
A & M, 25 5 expanded the constitutional right of family privacy to embrace
communications made by a child to his parent. In that case, a subpoena was
issued to the parents of John Doe, a sixteen year old boy, requiring them to
appear before a grand jury which was conducting an investigation into an
alleged arson. 25 6 Other witnesses had reported seeing the boy at the scene of
the fire and testimony was sought from his parents regarding admissions he
may have made to them. 2 7 The trial court granted the motion to quash the
subpoena on the ground that these child-parent conversations fell within the
scope of2 5the
New York statutory privilege for confidential marital communi8
cations.
On appeal, the Appellate Division reversed, refusing to enlarge any of the
existing statutory privileges. 259 The court, however, then undertook a detailed
245.

Id. at 747, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 914.

246. Id. at 747-48, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 914.
247. Id. at 748, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 914.
248. Id. at 748-49, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 914-15.
249. 2 Cal. 3d 415, 467 P.2d 557, 85 Cal. Rptr. 829 (1970).
250. See notes 215-17 supra and accompanying text.
251. E.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974); Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
252. 59 Cal. App. at 749, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 915.
253. Id. at 748, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 914.
254. Id. at 749, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 915.
255. 61 A.D.2d 426, 403 N.Y.S.2d 375 (1978).
256. Id. at 428, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 377.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 429, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 377. The court also rejected an assertion by the parents that the
statements made by the boy to his father were protected by the attorney-client privilege. Id. Although
the father was an attorney, the court concluded that "the boy was speaking to his father qua
father, not qua attorney," a conclusion supported by the fact that admissions were also made to
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analysis of the parents' claim that compelled testimony would violate their right
of privacy. Citing a long line of authority, the court concluded that "the
integrity of the family relational interests is clearly entitled to constitutional
protection. 2 60 It then embarked upon the more difficult task of balancing the
competing private and state interests. The necessity for openness and trust
between child and parent was acknowledged, as was the beneficial effect upon
society which would result from the fostering of a confidential child-parent
relationship.2 6 1 The court further stated that the idea of compelling a parent to
disclose his child's potentially incriminating statements revealed to the parent
262
in confidence "is shocking to our sense of decency, fairness and propriety."
In assessing the competing interests, the court recognized the "legitimate"
state objective of facilitating the adjudicatory process, but concluded that if the
information sought was divulged to the parents "for the purpose of obtaining
support, advice or guidance, ' 2 63 the societal interest in preserving and fostering
the child-parent relationship would outweigh the state's interest in factfinding. 264 The court, however, held that this right of nondisclosure did not excuse
the parents from appearing and testifying before the grand jury. 265 Nevertheless, the parents could not be compelled to answer questions which would
26 6
intrude upon the family's privacy.
The court emphasized that its recognition of a right of family privacy
surrounding certain communications between child and parent did not create a
privilege. 267 Notwithstanding this disclaimer, however, the effect of the decision does indeed suggest a narrow privilege for child-parent communications.
As formulated by the court, the "privilege" seems to encompass only communications made by a child to his parent and not vice versa.2 68 In this respect, it is
similar to the psychotherapeutic and other professional privileges which have
as their purpose the protection of patients' or clients' confidential statements ,269
unlike the marital confidential communications privilege which protects the
confidences of either partner. 270 Certainly the rationale for the privilege
-"that the fostering of a confidential parent-child relationship is necessary to
the child's development of a positive system of values, and results in an ultimate
good to society as a whole" 271-is primarily concerned with encouraging the
child to confide and preserving those confidences once they are made.
The most unusual aspect of the court's discussion is its statement, made in a
the boy's mother. Id. at 429, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 377-78; accord, In re Kinoy, 326 F. Supp. 400,
405-06 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
260. 61 A.D.2d at 432, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 380.
261. Id. at 432, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 380.
262. Id. at 433, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 380.
263. Id. at 433-34, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 380.
264. Id. at 435, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 381.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 436, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 382. A question regarding the boy's presence or absence from
home would not necessitate the divulgence of any intrafamily communications. Even under a
statutory confidential communications privilege, therefore, that type of inquiry could properly be
made. See notes 49-50 supra and accompanying text.
267. 61 A.D.2d at 434-35, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 381.
268. Id. at 435, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 381.
269. See note 65 supra.
270. See note 50 supra and accompanying text.
271. In re A & M, 61 A.D.2d at 433, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 380.
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footnote, that nondisclosure would be permissible only if all family members
wish to avoid disclosure. 272 The child, therefore, could not prevent his parents
from testifying, as is the case with most evidentiary privileges. 27 3 The court
was concerned that if the child was the sole holder, he could invoke the
privilege in proceedings instituted by parents who were unable to control his
behavior. 274
Recognizing a privilege only where it is the unanimous desire of the family to
maintain confidentiality severely restricts its scope. In In re Terry W., for
example, it was the juvenile defendant alone who attempted to assert the
privilege; apparently the mother had not objected to testifying.275s In Hunterv.
State, 276 an appeal from a conviction of cruelty to a child, the defendants
unsuccessfully sought to invoke a privilege to exclude the testimony of their
son. 277 In both of these cases, the parties were claiming a right to prevent other
family members from testifying and thus the privilege in In re A & M would
have been unavailable. In fact, the New York Appellate Division, in a recent
decision, reaffirmed this crucial aspect of the case by holding that a father's
testimony regarding his son's admission to him of criminal mischief was properly admissible 8when there was no evidence that the father had wished to
remain silent.

27

2.

Analysis

Although the decision in In re A & M possibly raises more questions
than it answers, 279 there are two issues in particular that merit more detailed
272.

Id. at 435 n.9, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 381 n.9.

273. Privileges are generally claimable by the communicating party who can then prevent the
other from divulging his confidences. See note 50 supra.
274. 61 A.D.2d at 435 n.9, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 381 n.9.
-,

275.
352
276.
277.

59 Cal. App. 3d at 747, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 914; accord, Cissna v. State, - Ind. App.-,
N.E.2d 793, 795 (1976).
- Ind. App. -,
360 N.E.2d 588 (1977).
Id. at -,
360 N.E.2d at 598.
In re Mark G., -A.D.2d -, 410 N.Y.S.2d 464 (1978). The court further stated that, unlike

278.
A & M, "[ilt does not appear that respondent made the statement to his father in confidence and for
the purpose of obtaining support, advice or guidance, nor that the father wished to remain silent and
keep respondent's answer confidential." Id. at -, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 465.
279. For example, although the court stated that a question regarding the boy's whereabouts on
the night of the fire would not invade the privacy of the family, it did not discuss whether the parents
could refuse to divulge any private communications made to them by their son or only those made
"for the purpose of obtaining support, advice or guidance." 61 A.D.2d at 433, 403 N.Y.S. 2d at 380.
The court's subsequent decision in In re Mark G., - A.D.2d -, 410 N. Y.S. 2d 464 (1978), suggests
that the latter may be the case. See note 278 supra. Narrowing the ambit of the "privilege" in this
way, however, seems to introduce an overly subjective element into a court's determination of
whether disclosure can be compelled. Not only would the court have to decide whether the communication was confidential, see note 50 supra and accompanying text, it would have to make the
additional finding as to the purpose of the child's statement. In order to make such a finding, it would
probably be necessary to reveal the subject matter of the communication, which would substantially
negate the salutary effects of permitting nondisclosure in the first place. Moreover, it would seem to
be difficult to determine exactly what type of communication would in fact be "for the purpose of
obtaining support, advice or guidance." If the court in In re A & M meant that in all cases an
additional determination as to the subject matter of the communication would have to be made, it Is
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discussion. The first is whether the court properly analyzed the competing
interests involved when it determined that certain confidential child-parent
communications are entitled to constitutional protection. If so, it must be
determined whether it is correct, from the standpoints of both constitutional
law and the policies the privilege is designed to promote, to permit its invocation only when all members of the child's family wish to preserve secrecy.
a.

The Competing Interests

As to the first issue, the court weighed the privacy interests of the parties
involved and the societal interest in protecting and fostering the parent-child
relationship against the state's "legitimate interest" in the factfinding process
and concluded that the interests in preserving confidentiality outweighed those
favoring disclosure. 28 0 Although its ultimate decision may be correct, the
court's analysis of the various competing interests was somewhat cursory.
It is clear that the state's interest in assuring that the truth is ascertained in
judicial and administrative proceedings may be more than merely "legitimate"
-some courts have held it to be compelling. 28 I The broad powers of a state to
compel testimony from its citizens and the general obligation of those citizens
to testify promote purposes which ultimately benefit society.2 82 Of course, the
state and public need for relevant testimony may be more pressing in some
situations than in others. For example, in criminal cases or grand jury
proceedings such as In re A & M, the duty of a subpoenaed witness to appear
and testify is subject to few exceptions. 28 3 In comparison, the needs of the
civil actions and the citizen's corresponding
state may not be as exigent in 284
testimonial duty not as strong.
The most obvious competing interest is, of course, the private right asserted
by the parties involved. The Supreme Court has never declared confidential
intrafamilial communications to be encompassed within the "private realm of
family life."'2 8 5 Yet, aside from the intimacies of the marital relationship, it
would be difficult to imagine an aspect of family life which is more inherently
6
private than confidential communications between child and parent.28 Those
suggested that this is too fine a line to draw. The better approach would be to fashion the scope of
protection along the lines of the marital confidential communications privilege; a presumption of
confidentiality would attach to all communications made between parent and child unless circumstances indicate otherwise. See note 50 supra and accompanying text.
Another issue not fully resolved by the court was whether the entire family, even those not a party
to the child's communication, must desire nondisclosure before a court should permit it. Giving a
family member who was not directly involved in the discussion the power to veto a decision by parent
and child not to disclose a particular communication seems not only unfair, but contrary to many of
the policies underlying the court's decision. The relationship most deserving of protection here is the
one which fostered the child's communication in the first place-the one between the child and parent
or parents in whom he has confided.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
because

61 A.D.2d at 433-34, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 380.
See note 225 supra and accompanying text.
See notes 1-3 supra and accompanying text.
See notes 166-67 supra and accompanying text.
See note 167 supra and accompanying text.
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
"Our decisions establish that the Constitution protects the sanctity of the family precisely
the family is deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition. It is through the family that
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matters which a child chooses to share with his parent and which both choose
to withhold from
others would seem encased in the very core of the zone of
287
family privacy.
Moreover, there is more at stake in the context of child-parent communicas
tions than merely a "balance of private right and public good. 288
As the court
in In re A & M stated, society also has an interest in fostering a confidential
relationship between parent and child. 289 Although judicial recognition of
enclaves of privacy in the immediate sense benefits only those individuals
29 0
directly involved in the litigation, in a larger sense it benefits all of society.
Those private rights that are deemed to be of constitutional dimension attain
that status because of a judicial determination that they are consistent with
values articulated
in the constitutional text and thus essential to the liberty of
29 1
all citizens.
. Balancing the several interests favoring nondisclosure against the public
interest in the admission of relevant evidence, it seems that in certain circumstances the possible exclusion of probative evidence may be outweighed by the
benefits of preserving confidentiality. 292 Factors to be considered include
whether the action is civil or criminal, whether the information sought is
essential to a claim or defense of one of the parties to the proceeding, and
whether the same information can be obtained through other means. 293 In
addition, it should be remembered that the privilege created in In re A & M
is substantially more restrictive than other confidential communications privileges because it can be invoked only if both the communicating child and the
parent or parents to whom the communication is made agree on nondisclosure. 294 Consequently, the instances in which its assertion may hinder litigation
are greatly reduced.
b. Who Should Hold the Privilege?
The question remains as to whether a joint privilege will adequately further
the underlying societal interests involved and protect the privacy interests of
we inculcate and pass down many of our most cherished values, moral and cultural." Moore v. City
of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503-04 (1977) (footnotes omitted).
287. "The essence of privacy is no more, and certainly no less, than the freedom of the individual
to pick and choose for himself the time and circumstances under which, and most importantly, the
extent to which, his attitudes, beliefs, behavior and opinions are to be shared with or withheld from
others." Ruebhausen & Brim, Privacyand BehavioralResearch, 65 Colum. L. Rev. 1184, 1188-89
(1965).
288.

Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 Colum. L. Rev. 1410, 1432 (1974).

289. 61 A.D.2d at 433, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 380.
290. See Caesar v. Mountanos, 542 F.2d 1064, 1073 (9th Cir. 1976) (Hufstedler, J., dissenting),
cert. denied, 430 U.S. 954 (1977). See also Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 75 (1976).
291.

Cf. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542-43 (1960) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (concepts of due

process and liberty not limited to the terms of specific constitutional guarantees); Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1927) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (privacy one aspect of the broad scopes of
constitutionally protected rights).
292. '[T]here are things even more important to human liberty than accurate adjudication. One
of them is the right to be left by the state unmolested in certain human relations .... [WIhatever
handicapping of the adjudicatory processiscaused by recognition of the privileges, it is not too great a
price to pay for secrecy in certain communicative relations." Privileges Today, supra note 8, at 110.
293. See C. McCormick, supra note 6, § 77, at 159-60.
294.

61 A.D.2d at 435 n.9, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 381 n.9.
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both the minor and his parents, if indeed the latter have any assertable rights
at all.2 9 5 If secrecy is sought by both the child and his parents, as in In re
A & M, 296 the conflict is merely one between the state and the autonomous
family unit. When there is a clash between the wishes of child and parent,
however, the issues become more complex, raising problems of the individual
child's assertable right of privacy
as against both the interests of the state and
2 97
the wishes of his parent.
The right of privacy extends to minors as well as adults and the minor's right
to make certain fundamental decisions affecting his life may in some situations
be paramount to any competing interests of both his parents and the state. For
example, in Planned Parenthoodv. Danforth, 298 the Supreme Court held that
a state may not impose a blanket provision requiring the consent of a parent
before an unmarried minor can obtain an abortion.2 99 One of the rationales
asserted by the state in support of the consent requirement was its interest in
preserving family autonomy and parental control.3 0 0 The Court rejected the
idea that giving a parent veto power would in any way strengthen the family
unit or augment parental authority when there is such fundamental dissension
between the nonconsenting parent and the minor . 3a0 Thus, although the state
does have a significant interest in preserving the family, the statutory provisions did not further that interest. Similarly, in Carey v. Population Services, 30 2 a plurality of the Court held unconstitutional a New York statute
prohibiting any sale or distribution of contraceptives to minors under the age
of sixteen, stating that minors have a right to privacy in connection with
decisions affecting procreation. 30 3 The Court expressed doubt as to the
validity of the state's contention that limiting access to contraceptives would
in any way promote its interest in discouraging sexual activity among the
30 4
young.
Although Carey and Danforth stand for the proposition that, in the absence
of substantial justification, the state cannot infringe upon a child's right to
295. The cases that have discussed a constitutional foundation for the psychotherapist-patient
privilege have unformly held that whatever privacy rights are involved belong to the communicating
patient, rather than the doctor. Caesar v. Mountanos, 542 F.2d 1064, 1070 (9th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 430 U.S. 954 (1977); United States ex rel. Edney v. Smith, 425 F. Supp. 1038, 1043-44
(E.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd, 556 F.2d 556 (2d Cir. 1977); In re Lifschutz, 2 Cal.3d 415, 423-24,467 P.2d
557, 561-63, 85 Cal. Rptr. 829, 833-35 (1970). Analogizing the child-parent relationship to that of
patient and psychotherapist, see notes 63-66 supra and accompanying text, it might initially seem as
though the privacy rights are those of the child solely.
296. 61 A.D.2d at 428, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 377.
297. See generally J. Holt, Escape from Childhood 18-19 (1974); Garvey, Child, Parent, State,
and the Due ProcessClause: An Essay on the Supreme Court'sRecent Work, 51 S. Cal. L. Rev. 769
(1978); Kleinfeld, The Balance of PowerAmong Infants, Their Parents,and State, 4 Fan. L.Q. 410
(1970).
298. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
299. Id. at 74.
300. Id. at 75.
301. Id. But see Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 147 (1976) (state may require some type of
parental consent for the performance of an abortion on a minor, so long as the minor's best interests
are protected).
302. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
303. Id. at 693.
304. Id. at 697-99.
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make certain decisions, it is unlikely that his independent right to privacy in the
area of confidential intrafamily communications would outweigh the competing
state and parental interests. State restrictions on the privacy rights of minors
are subject to a less stringent test than that used for adults. 30 5 Moreover, unlike
Carey and Danforth, where the respective restrictions did not significantly
promote the asserted state interests, it is obvious that compelling citizens to
testify directly furthers the strong state interest in accurate adjudication. It
seems improbable, therefore, that in the absence of a statutory privilege, the
child could assert a sufficiently strong privacy interest to prevent disclosure by
his parents.
From a policy viewpoint the case for making the child the sole holder
becomes stronger. Certainly if the only purpose of the privilege was to encourage the child to communicate to his parents, giving the child the power to
determine whether such confidences are revealed in the courtroom would most
further that goal. The child would then be absolutely assured that whatever is
revealed to his parents in confidence will remain private unless he chooses to
divulge it, or permits his parents to do so. For this reason, the overwhelming
number of statutory privileges for confidential communications between husband and wife grant the privilege to the communicating spouse. 30 6 Similarly,
most psychotherapist-patient privileges belong to the patient, 30 7 or, if claimable
by the psychotherapist, can be waived only with the consent of the patient.30 8
Fostering open communication, however, is not the only objective of the
privilege. An equally important goal is that of promoting a therapeutic relationship between parent and child in which the parent can provide the guidance,
discipline, and direction which are so essential to the child's emotional
growth. 30 9 Constructing a privilege which allows the child to prevent his
parent from testifying would not further this purpose, but rather would frus31
trate it.

0

A child-parent privilege establishing the child as the sole holder in effect
usurps the parental role at a time when it is most urgently needed. Compelled
disclosure of a child's confidences is most likely to be sought when the child is
suspected of involvement in some delinquent activity. This is often a period of
crisis for the entire family, a period when the child is greatly in need of advice
and guidance. In light of the policies the privilege is designed to promote, it
would seem that the parent should have some input into the decision as to
whether the child's confidences should be disclosed.
In addition to counteracting many of the underlying policy rationales, a
privilege recognizing the child as sole holder might seriously infringe upon the
305. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. at 692-94; Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428
U.S. at 72-75; Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 at 638 (1968).
306. See note 50 supra and accompanying text.
307. See notes 63-65 supra and accompanying text.
308. See notes 63-65 supra and accompanying text.
309. See notes 114-29 supra and accompanying text.
310.

The Supreme Court's reasoning in DafortIh that family harmony would not be pre-

served by giving a parent the power to veto his child's decision to obtain an abortion, 428 U.S. at 75,
seems equally applicable in the context of child-parent communications; the integrity of the family
unit will not be substantially preserved by giving either the child or the parent the power to prevent
the other from testifying.
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parents' right to direct the upbringing of theii child. In fact, the historical 3 "1
and constitutiona 3 12 protection accorded to the family unit, is primarily a
recognition of the parental right to care for and nurture their offspring. 31 3 This
right, however, carries with it attendant responsibilities and correlative rights
in the child. The child has the right to receive parental guidance and physical
and emotional nurture. 31 4 Although the child's right to be directed until maturity has not explicitly been held to be of constitutional dimension, it is a natural
3 15
outgrowth of parental rights and responsibilities.
On occasion the child's independent right of decisionmaking may conflict
with his right to emotional nurture and guidance. One writer has characterized
these as "rights of choice" and "rights of protection. ' 3 16 When a parent feels
that disclosure of his child's misdeeds is in the child's best interests, but the
child himself wants to maintain secrecy there is a conflict between these
respective rights. The preservation and fostering of family autonomy necessitates that a minor's rights of choice be subordinated in many instances to his
rights of protection. 317 The decision as to whether communications divulged in
confidence by a child to his parents is one which should not be left solely to the
choice of the child.
311. At common law, the autonomous family unit traditionally received broad protection from
courts. Thus, parents have always been presumptively entitled to the custody of their children. See
Foster & Freed, Child Custody (pt. 1), 39 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 423, 424-27 (1964); Sayre, Awarding
Custody ofChildren, 9 U. Chi. L. Rev. 672, 673-76 (1942). Additionally, parents have the right to
their child's companionship. See W. Prosser, The Law of Torts § 124 (4th ed. 1971) (discussing the
right of parents to recover for injuries or wrongful death of their children as based on both economic
and associational interests of the parents). Parents also have the right to utilize the services of their
children. See W. Tiffany, Persons and Domestic Relations 340-43 (3d ed. 1921). Moreover, parents
and children have certain reciprocal rights and duties vis-a-vis each other, such as the child's right to
receive and the parent's duty to provide support. See Roe v. Doe, 29 N.Y.2d 188, 193-94, 272 N. E.2d
567, 569-70, 324 N.Y.S.2d 71, 74-75 (1971). Finally, the child has historically had a right to state
protection from parental abuse. See Hafen, Children'sLiberationand the New Egalitarianism:Some
Reservations About Abandoning Youth to Their "Rights", 1976 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 605, 614 (1976).
312. See notes 233-39 supra and accompanying text.
313. Most cases dealing directly with the concept of family integrity have involved claims of
state interference with this right. See notes 238-39 supra and accompanying text. It should be noted
that in several of the Supreme Court cases recognizing a right of family privacy, claims of free
exercise of religion as well as parental authority were asserted. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,
208-09 (1972); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 532 (1925). Tlhese first amendment claims
strengthened the parental interests involved. Wisconsin v. Yoder. 406 U.S. at 233, Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. at 534-35. Furthermore, Pierce and Yoder involved disputes between
parents and state overthe minor's best interests; the child played a passive role in the conflicL Accord,
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). Thus, these decisions are not dispositive of the state's duty
to uphold parental authority in situations where the exercise of that authority is in direct conflict with
the minor's claim to a right of privacy. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 241-46 (Douglas, J..
dissenting in part). They do establish, however, that parents have a constitutionally protected right
to the physical and emotional care of their children.
314. See Foster & Freed, A Bill of Rights for Children. 6 Fam. L.Q. 343. 347-50 (1972);
Comment, The Rights of Children: A Trust Model. 46 Fordham L. Rev. 669. 716-29 (1978)
(physical and emotional nurture).
315. Hafen, Puberty, Privacy and Protection: The Risks qf Children's "Rights," 63 A.B A J.
1383, 1387 (1977).
316. Id. at 1387-88.
317. See note 313 supra and accompanying text.
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The enactment of a child-parent privilege which gives the child the right to
prevent his parents from testifying would clearly be an intrusion upon the
parental role at a critical period of the juvenile's life. 3 18 The interest which the
state has in preserving the autonomy of the family is not furthered by giving
3 19
one family member the absolute power to prevent the others from testifying.
On the contrary, such a statute might well have the effect of eroding whatever
harmony exists between parent and child. Furthermore, the societal interest in
the healthy emotional development of the child is best served not by giving the
child the right to veto parental decisions, but rather by allowing those decisions
to be made within the confines of the family.3 2 0 Even the objective of encourag-

ing the child to confide in his parents32 1 may be better attained by a joint,
rather than a unilateral, privilege. Establishing a joint privilege will inevitably
increase child-parent interaction, since the decision regarding disclosure will
then be a communal one.
There are other reasons as well for denying a privilege when parent and child
cannot agree. When one wants to disclose and the other does not, whether it be
parent or child who desires secrecy, the rationale of preserving family harmony
greatly diminishes. At such a juncture, family harmony, at least on this issue,
has in all probability disappeared. The morally repugnant aspect of compelling
disclosure of child-parent communications 322 is also substantially removed
when either the parent or child seeks to admit the testimony. What is "shocking to our sense of decency" 323 is the coercive nature of such testimony-that
the parent can be forced to reveal intimate and potentially incriminating
matters about his child. If the parent in fact wishes to testify, that coercive
element disappears. If it is the child himself who desires disclosure, the repugnancy justification also largely disappears. At that point, it does not seem
offensive or unfair to require the parent to testify.
CONCLUSION

Perhaps more than any other socially beneficial association, the relationship
between child and parent is one which should be sedulously fostered and
protected. Admittedly, the family is no longer the exalted institution it once
was. 324 Divorce rates are increasing 325 and divorce itself is no longer a stigmatizing event. 326 Children are more likely today to be raised in single parent
homes. 327 Moreover, increasing numbers of individuals are rejecting the idea
318. See notes 135-37 supra and accompanying text.
319. See note 301 supra and accompanying text.
320. See notes 112-17 supra and accompanying text.
321. See notes 127-30 supra and accompanying text.
322. See notes 150-60 supra and accompanying text.
323. In re A & M, 61 A.D.2d 426, 433, 403 N.Y.S.2d 375, 380 (1978).
324. See Birdwhistell, The Idealized Model ofthe AmericanFamily, in TheFamily 310(P. Stein,
J. Richman & N. Hannon eds. 1977).
325. H. Bass & M. Rein, Divorce or Marriage 3 (1976).
326. Weitzman, Legal Regulation of Marriage: Tradition and Change, 62 Calif. L. Rev. 1169,
1203 (1974).
327. See LeMasters, Parents Without Partners, in Intimacy, Family and Society 522-23 (A.
Skolnick & J. Skolnick eds. 1974).
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that the nuclear family is the only or best way in which to raise children. 3 28 For
those who do choose a more traditional lifestyle, expanding urbanization and
geographic mobility have physically and psychologically isolated many families
support which was formerly provided by the surand diminished the social
3 29
rounding community.
Rather than being arguments against the establishment of a privilege, however, these trends suggest that there may be more of a need for a privilege today
than ever before. It has been suggested, for example, that higher incidences of
divorce may mean that those families which do remain intact are held together
not so much out of duty and tradition, but out of affection. 330 Additionally, the
insularity of the American family increases the importance of positive relationships within that unit. Rapid social change makes it more necessary than ever
for a child to have an adult figure he can turn to for guidance and advice; the
parent is best prepared to fullfill this role. 33 1 The creation of a child-parent
privilege would ensure that this relationship, once established, was not damaged by compelling the parent to divulge his child's intimate disclosures.

Susan Levine
APPENDIX
PRIVILEGE FOR CONFIDENTIAL COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN CHILD AND
PARENT

(a) Statement of Privilege
In all civil and criminal actions and proceedings where testimony under oath
is required, 332 a parent or parents 3 33 and hisftheir legal minor child, 334 whether
or not any or all are parties, 335 have a joint privilege to refuse to disclose any
328. See, e.g., A. Skolnick, supra note 77, at 140-49.
329. J. Conger, supra note 89, at 197-200; A. Skolnick & J. Skolnick, Domeste, Relations and
Social Change, in Intimacy, Family, and Society 14 (A. Skolnick & J. Skolnick eds. 1974)_
330. Weitzman, supra note 326, at 1203; Hutchins & Slesinger. supra note 56, at 679.
331. See J. Horrocks, The Psychology of Adolescence 42-43 (2d ed. 1962).
332. The parent will not be immune from service of process. See In re A & M, 261 A.D.2d 426,
435, 403 N.Y.S.2d 375, 381 (1978). As with other confidential communications privileges, the parent
will not be able to raise the issue of privilege until he has actually appeared and been questioned. See 8
J. Wigrnore, supra note 3, § 2197, at 113-14.
333. If the communication is made to one parent, the child and that parent are the holders of the
privilege. If the communication is made to both parents, all three are holders. A family member who
was not a participant in the conversation, however, is not a holder. Therefore. unlike in In re
A & M, it is not necessary that all family members seek to preserve confidentiality before a
privilege will attach. See notes 272-73 supra and accompanying text.
334. The privilege will only attach to communications made by a minor child. Accord, Cobur,
supra note 20, at 632. As the child approaches emancipation, the underlying rationale for the
privilege, i.e., to preserve the therapeutic relationship, gradually diminishes in importance. Of
course, equally intimate statements may be made by an adult to his parent. As far as the interests of
the state and society are concerned, however, the need for a privilege is far stronger during the child's
developmental years. See notes 107-17 supra and accompanying text.
335. See note 50 supra accompanying text.
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communications made by the minor to his parent(s) if both the child and
parent(s) desire nondisclosure 336 and the communication was made by the child
in confidence to him/them.
(b) Who Can Claim the Privilege
Unless there is an express waiver by one of the parties entitled to waive the
privilege, the privilege may be claimed by the child on behalf of himself and his
parent(s) or by a parent or parents to whom the communication was made on
337
behalf of himself/themselves and his/their child.
(c) Waiver of the Privilege
(1) Any of the following parties may waive the privilege with respect to a
communication otherwise protected by it:
(A) One or both parents to whom the communication was made and
who are entitled to claim the privilege. 3 38
(B) The child who made the communication.
(2) Waiver shall be effected either by express oral or written consent to
disclosure made without coercion or by a failure on the part of the child or
parent(s) to object when the contents of a communication are demanded.3 3 9
(d) Definitions
(1) A communication includes spoken words or acts 340 of the child intended
to convey a meaning to the parent or parents.
(2) A communication is confidential if made in reliance upon the childparent relation and out of the presence of third persons who are not members
34 1
of the child's immediate family.
(e) Presumption of Confidentiality
A presumption of confidentiality will attach to any communication which is
claimed by both parent(s) and child to be confidential and the opponent of the
privilege will have the burden of proof to establish that the communication was
342
not confidential.
(f) Exception-Crime or Fraud
There will be no privilege if the court finds that sufficient evidence, aside
from the communication, has been introduced to warrant a finding that the
336. But see Coburn, supra note 20, at 632 (child can claim privilege to prevent parent from
testifying).
337. Either the child or parent can claim the privilege on the other's behalf; there need not be an
affirmative claim of privilege by all of the holders. The purpose of this provision is to prevent the loss
of the privilege if one of the holders is not before the court. See, e.g., In re Kinoy, 326 F.Supp. 400
(1970) (father was compelled to reveal daughter's whereabouts in connection with a grand jury
investigation).
338. The effect of this waiver provision is that the pnvilege can be invoked only where both
parent and child seek to preserve the confidentiality of the communication.
339. Accord, Cal. Evid. Code § 912 (West 1966).
340. See note 49 supra and accompanying text.
341. Although siblings and other family members cannot claim the privilege, their presence at
the time the confidential statement was made should not nullify it. See Coburn, supra note 20, at
632-33. This is contrary to the general rule for marital confidential communications which disallows a
privilege when the communication is made in the presence of the spouses'children. See note 20supra.
342. See note 50 supra.
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communication was made, in whole or in part, to enable or aid anyone to
343
commit or plan to commit a crime or fraud.
344
(g) Exception-Commitment Proceeding
There is no privilege in a proceeding to commit either the child or parent to
whom the communication was made or otherwise to place him or his property
under the control of another because of his alleged mental or physical condition.
345
(h) Exception-ProceedingBetween Parent and Child or Between Spouses
(1) There is no privilege in a civil proceeding brought by or on behalf of one
spouse against the other spouse.
(2) There is no privilege in a civil proceeding brought by or on behalf of a
parent or child against the other.
34 6

(i) Exception-Criminal Proceedings
(1) There is no privilege in a criminal proceeding in which a parent otherwise
able to claim the privilege is charged with a crime committed at any time
against the person or property of the communicating child, the parent's spouse,
or a legal child of either the parent or the parent's spouse.
(2) There is no privilege in a criminal proceeding in which a child otherwise
able to claim the privilege is charged with a crime committed at any time
against the person or property of a parent or a legal child of a parent.
(3) There will be no privilege in a criminal proceeding in which a parent is
charged with:
(A) Child abuse
(B) Adultery
(C) Child neglect
(D) Abandonment or Non-support.
343. See note 58 supra.
344. This is a common exception to the marital confidential communications privilege. See, e.g.,
Cal. Evid. Code § 982 (West 11,66).
345. This exception encompasses divorce or separation proceedings and civil actions within the
family. See, e.g., id. § 984.
346. Although these provisions may appear to be unnecessary since the privilege can be waived
by either parent or child, provision is made for nonrecognition of a privilege when a crime has been
committed within the family to ensure that a parent will not be able to influence or coerce his child
into claiming a privilege.

